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RESTRUCTURING THE LEGISLATURE: A
PROPOSAL FOR UNICAMERALISM IN
WASHINGTON
The last decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the demands
on members of the Washington State Legislature. As this problem has
evolved, various institutional modifications have been introduced to
maintain a part-time "citizens' legislature" which can adequately deal
with the legislative matters confronting it. These changes include an
increase in the number of extraordinary sessions;' creation of parallel
committees in the senate and house, and increased use of joint committees;2 institution of the "continuing session" concept, whereby the
entire legislature is called into session when standing committees promulgate sufficient proposed legislation for consideration; 3 and change
in the appointment of legislative staffs. 4 These changes, however, have
neither decreased the amount of time demanded of state legislators,
nor maintained the "citizen" nature of the legislature. On the contrary, institution of these changes has ameliorated none of the problems they were designed to solve.
One institutional alteration which should now be seriously con1. See note 43 infra.
2. See Mardesich & Sawyer, Introduction to Symposium: Recent Washington Legislation, 49 WASH. L. REV. 287 (1974).

3. Id. The continuing session was designed by former House of Representatives
Speaker Leonard Sawyer and former Senate Majority Leader August Mardesich, both
Democrats, in 1971 to enable the legislature to meet throughout the biennium. The
optimal goals of the concept were described by Senator Mardesich as follows:
The continuing session concept is designed to provide needed legislative efficiency,
quality and flexibility. Essentially, the standing committees continue to meet
during the year and the entire Legislature is called back into session only when
there are enough bills for its consideration. This procedure achieves several purposes. Most significantly, it should forestall the demise of the citizen Legislature.
As demands for legislative action increase, so does the tendency to create a fulltime professional legislature. The result of this tendency is that the legislative
body can become insulated from the people and can take on the negative characteristics of a bureaucracy. The continuing session concept not only allows a
legislator meaningful time in his district in direct contact with its problems, but
also provides a forum for those problems to be analyzed. In addition, this year
has marked a significant increase in public hearings.... [T] he continuing session
is not a step toward a full-time professional legislature, but rather it is a means
of maintaining and strengthening the citizen Legislature.
Id. at 288. As indicated by the results of the authors' poll, some legislators are not
satisfied with the continuing session concept, see Appendix A infra, and it has not been
entirely successful in preventing the installation of at least a de facto full-time legislature.
4. Mardesich & Sawyer, supra note 2, at 289.
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sidered is that proposed by a number of authors and political organizations: 5 creation of a unicameral legislature. Although such a system
cannot be considered a panacea to the multitude of problems facing
the state legislature, it can provide an institutional framework within
which the legislature can function more effectively.
The efficacy of a proposed unicameral legislature depends upon the
specific structural arrangements enacted. As a basis of comparison
and as a suggested model, this comment suggests a unicameral legislature comprised of 49 members (the same size as the existing state
senate). These legislators would serve in a full-time capacity and be
paid a full-time salary. They would be assisted by a permanent staff of
a size commensurate with that of the existing legislature, but part-time
assistance would be curtailed. This comment seeks to demonstrate
that the adoption of a unicameral system will lead to enhanced legislative efficiency at a reduced cost to taxpayers.
The tenability of such a unicameral legislature in Washington will
be analyzed by examining: 1) the background and history of unicameralism; 2) the effect of the reapportionment cases on the need for a
bicameral legislature; 3) the "efficiency" of a unicameral as opposed
to a bicameral legislature; and 4) means of implementing a change
from bicameralism to unicameralism. In addition, results of the authors' poll of state legislators and a sample constitutional amendment
are presented.
I.

THE BACKGROUND OF UNICAMERALISM IN
WASHINGTON
The traditional American sentiment toward state legislative organi-

5. The unicameral concept has received the endorsement of a number of state and
national groups that deal with the needs of state legislatures. The National Municipal
League has endorsed a unicameral legislature in each edition of its Model State Constitution, and asserts that a one-house legislature is more representative, more efficient.
and more responsible than a bicameral body. See D'Alemberte & Fishburne, The Unicameral Legislature, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 355, 363 (1964). The American Political
Science Association's Committee on American Legislatures has convincingly set forth
the arguments in favor of unicameralism. See A. STURM, MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES IN WEST VIRGINIA 49-50 (1961), citing AM. POL. Sci. ASS'N, AMERICAN STATE
LEGISLATURE 57-78 (B. Zeller ed. 1954). Newspapers have also adopted such positions
in editorializing for unicameralism in state legislatures. See D'Alemberte & Fishburne.
supra at 355 nn.4-5; Note, Unicameralism and Bicameralism: History and Tradition,
45 BOSTON U.L. REV. 250. 251 n.l 1 (1965).
In Washington, a number of newspapers have urged consideration of unicameralism
in editorials. See, e.g., Bellingham Herald, Jan. 16, 1974, at 12, col. 4; Seattle PostIntelligencer, Feb. 19, 1974, § A, at 11, col. 2.
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zation has been that a bicameral legislature is essential to the protection of the liberties of the people, and that two legislative bodies more
accurately reflect the interests of the governed.6 As a result, American
legislative bodies, both federal and state, have been predominately
bicameral, although unicameral bodies have been either considered or
utilized on a number of occasions.7 Nebraska is currently the only
8
state to utilize a unicameral legislature.
6. Bicameralism in America can be traced to British antecedents. The bicameral
British Parliament has traditionally been composed of an hereditary upper house
(House of Lords) and an elected lower house (House of Commons). See generally
S. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 43-51 (1948). Such an arrangement,

in theory, protected civil liberties by according power to various elements of society.
No one social group could dominate the social order and deprive the people represented of their liberties.
Colonial legislatures were similarly comprised: "By the early eighteenth century
English constitutional theory was commonly applied to American institutions as the
lower houses of the colonial legislatures came more definitely to stand for local, popular interests and the upper houses, the colonial Councils, appeared to approximate
the classical upper chambers, prototypically the House of Lords." B. BAILYN, THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 61 (1968); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE,
REPRESENTATION AND APPORTIONMENT 9 (1966). See also A. JOHNSON, UNICAMERAL

LEGISLATURE 3-11 (1938). In these early bicameral legislatures, members of the upper
house were required to have higher qualifications than members of the lower house.
In New Jersey, for example, candidates for the lower house were required to have a
freehold of 500 pounds, while candidates for the upper house were required to have a
freehold of 1,000 pounds. Other states, including Massachusetts and Maryland, placed
more stringent financial, residency, and age requirements on candidates for the upper
house than they did on candidates for the lower house. See B. LONG, GENESIS OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 174 (1926). South Carolina's constitution of 1778 required senators to possess 2,000 pounds in land. North Carolina's
1776 constitution restricted the right to vote for members of the senate to owners of
not less than 50 acres. Similarly, the electorate for the upper house in New York was
restricted so that senatorial electors were only about one-fourth as numerous as
electors for members of the lower house. See H. SUMMERS, UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURES
49-51 (1936); Note, Unicameralism and Bicameralism: History and Tradition, supra
note 5, at 255-59. Similarly, until its amendment in 1913, the United States Constitution provided that the upper house (Senate) members be elected by the state legislatures, while the lower house (House of Representatives) members be popularly elected.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. See generally S. MORRISON,
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 306-08 (1965). In all of these bicameral legislatures, each house provided a fresh "second look" at the other's legislation because of differences in the election process or candidate qualifications between
the upper and lower house. These differences meant that each house represented the
interests of a different portion of society. The "second look" provided by the second
house was therefore not mere repetition, but represented the ratification of a different
portion of the population from that represented in the first house. The response to the
reapportionment cases and their demand that both houses in the legislature be based
on population has substantially undermined this "second look" rationale for retaining
a bicameral legislature. See text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
7. State governments in the United States have been patterned to a striking degree
upon the federal model, although a few states have utilized the unicameral form
briefly. For example, Pennsylvania, in part because of the great influence of Benjamin Franklin as president of its constitutional convention, utilized unicameralism
for about four years in the 1790's. Georgia had a unicameral legislature for 12 years
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On a number of occasions the State of Washington has considered
proposals for a unicameral legislature. As early as 1915, the governor
suggested in a message to the legislature that a unicameral legislature
would be advisable.9 Since that time 23 bills have been introduced in
the Washington legislature to establish a unicameral legislature. 10 A
after the Revolution and Vermont employed the unicameral form for 60 years
(1777 to 1836). See A. JOHNSON. supra note 6,at 32-44.
The Progressive Era of the early twentieth century, with its examples of legislative
corruption and governmental insensitivity to socio-economic changes associated with
industrialization, did lead to a brief questioning of existing patterns of legislative organization. See generally R. HOFSTADTER. THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 164-85 (1948); L. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA (1958). Oregon in 1912 and 1914, Oklahoma in 1914, and Arizona in
1916 unsuccessfully sought to achieve unicameral legislatures through constitutional
amendments. See H. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 45-47, 172. Ohio, New York, and
California also considered the unicameral form during this period. See A. JOHNSON.
supra note 6, at 95-128; Comment, A Unicameral Legislature in New York: A Review and A Proposal, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 307 (1967).
In more recent years. the unicameral concept was considered and rejected in Montana and North Dakota in 1972. In North Dakota the voters rejected unicameralism
by a vote of 108,378 to 47,938. 61 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 355 (1972). In Montana the
voters decided to retain bicameralism, but 44% of the people voted for a unicameral
legislature. Id. In both states, unicameralism was presented as part of a comprehensive
constitutional revision. In both states, only limited campaigns were mounted in favor
of the amendments and proponents of unicameralism were unable to educate the
people as to the merits of unicameralism, in part because of limited campaign funds.
Omdahl. Drive for Unicaneralisn Needs National Support, 63 Civic REV. 526.
529-30(1974).
8. Nebraska changed from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature in 1934. when
nearly 60% of the voters amended the constitution to substitute a body of 43 members for the bicameral legislature originally adopted at the time of statehood. See
H. SUMMERS, supra note 6,at 46-47.
9. Governor Ernest Lister stated:
I do not believe that a form of state government should be adopted that would
place in the hands of the same officials legislative and administrative powers. I
do believe, however, that better results would be obtained if we had one legislative
body in the state consisting of say not to exceed twenty-five members, five elected
from each congressional district ... and by fixing the time of each regular session
of the legislature at ninety instead of sixty days.
S. JOUR., 14th [Wash. State] Legis., Reg. Sess. 79 (1915).
10. In the Washington State House of Representatives the following bills were
introduced: H.R. 112, 14th [Wash. State] Legis., Reg. Sess. (1915); H.RJ. Res. 5.
23d [Wash. State] Legis.. Reg. Sess. (1933); H.R. 675, 24th [Wash. State] Legis., Reg.
Sess. (1935); H.R.J. Res. 10, 21, 28, 32, & H.R. 375. 25th [Wash. State] Legis.. Reg.
Sess. (1937); H.R.J. Res. 5, 9. 26th [Wash. State] Legis.. Reg. Sess. (1939); H.RJ.
Res. 8, 20, 27th [Wash. State] Legis., Reg. Sess. (1941); H.RJ. Res. 49, 41st [Wash.
State] Legis., IstEx. Sess. (1969); H.R. 276, 43d [Wash. State] Legis., Reg. Sess.
(1973); H.R.J. Res. 54, 44th [Wash. State] Legis., 1st Ex. Sess. (1975). All died in
committee except H.R. 112 and H.RJ. Res. 28. H.R. 112 was given a "do pass"
recommendation by the Committee on Constitutional Revision, but the House took
no further action. H.R. JOUR., 14th [Wash. State] Legis.. Reg. Sess. 1006 (1915).
H.R.J. Res. 28 was passed by the House but died in the Senate. S. JOUR. 25th [Wash.
State] Legis., Reg. Sess. 970 (1937).
In the Washington State Senate, the following were proposed: S. 207, 25th [Wash.
State] Legis., Reg. Sess. (1937); S.J. Res. 11, 25th [Wash. State] Legis.. Reg. Sess.
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1937 bill to establish unicameralism passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 67-30 but failed to secure a third reading in the
Senate despite a "do pass" recommendation from the Senate Committee on Constitutional Revision. 1 A more recent resolution, introduced in the House by seven representatives, proposed a comprehensive revision of the legislative article of the Washington constitution. 12
The resolution died in committee.' 3 Despite its questionable constitutionality,' 4 four attempts have been made to bring about a unicameral
legislature in Washington via the initiative process. 15 None of these
(1937); SJ. Res. 3, 26th [Wash. State] Legis., Reg. Sess. (1939); SJ. Res. 20, 35th
[Wash. State] Legis., Reg. Sess. (1957); SJ. Res. 118, 43d [Wash. State] Legis., Reg.
Sess. (1973). All of the measures failed to be reported out of committee except SJ.
Res. 11, which was given a "do pass" recommendation by the Committee on Constitutional Revision. S. JOUR., 25th [Wash. State] Legis., Reg. Sess. 834 (1937).
11. H.RJ. Res. 28 provided for a unicameral legislature of between 95 and 110
members elected from the then-existing districts for the Washington State House of
Representatives for two-year terms. H.RJ. Res. 28, art. I, §§ 2, 4, 25th [Wash. State]
Legis., Reg. Sess. (1937). The resolution called for retention of the lieutenant governor as presiding officer, id., § 9, and compensation for members of ten dollars per
day while the legislature was in session, and five cents per mile traveling to and from
the session. Id., § 21. Biennial legislative sessions were mandated. Id., § 11.
The Senate, however, proposed to amend the measure by limiting the body to
between 46 and 60 members elected for staggered four-year terms from then-existing
senatorial districts. Id., art. I-A, § 1. Annual sessions were required, and compensation for members of $1,500 per annum plus traveling expenses was provided. Id., §§
4-5. The substantial differences in the Senate and House versions of H.RJ. Res. 28
may account for its failure to pass in the Senate.
12. H.RJ. Res. 54, 44th [Wash. State] Legis. 1st Ex. Sess. 683 (1975). The bill,
first\read on March 25, 1975, was sponsored by Representatives Charnley (D), Eikenberry (R), Eng (D), Erickson (D), Hawkins (D), Nelson (R), and Patterson (R).
It was referred to the House Committee on State Government.
13. Id.
14. See Part IV-A infra.
15. A unicameral legislature was proposed by the following initiative measures:
No. 144, February 23, 1940; No. 147, April 9, 1940; and No. 268, February 8, 1972,
on file with the Secretary of State for the State of Washington. No. 144 was withdrawn,
No. 147 failed to obtain the requisite number of signatures to be certified for the ballot, and No. 268 was refused a ballot title by the Attorney General on his opinion

that the initiative mechanism may not be used to amend the constitution. See Part
IV-A infra. Initiative to the Legislature No. 10, May 23, 1940, on file with the Secretary of State for the'State of Washington, failed because no signatures were submitted
for consideration.
Initiative measures Nos. 144 and 147, and Initiative to the Legislature No. 10 were
approximately the same plan, with some minor deviations. The measures provided for
a unicameral legislature elected from legislative districts corresponding to then-existing
congressional districts for two-year terms. Sessions of the legislature were to be annual.
The measures also provided for a Legislative Council consisting of two members
appointed by the legislature from each of the six legislative districts and presided over
by the Lieutenant Governor. The responsibility of the Council was to investigate and
conduct hearings upon the behavior of all levels of government and give consideration
to legislation to make recommendations to the legislature and establish an agenda for
the legislative sessions. The governor and the heads of the executive, departments
were to participate in an ex officio capacity in the investigations and deliberations of
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attempts, however, has resulted in the placement of a unicameral pro16
posal on the ballot.
II.

THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES

Prior to 1962 a traditional reason for retaining a bicameral state
legislature was a desire to model a state government as closely as possible after Congress. By differentiating between the constituencies represented by each house of the legislature, it was theorized that the two
houses would represent different interests while providing a "second
look" at one another's legislative actions.1 7 The Supreme Court decisions in Baker v. Carr18 and Reynolds v. Sims,19 however, eliminated
the possibility of states following the federal model, by requiring both
houses of a state legislature to be apportioned on the basis of popula20
tion.
Prior to Baker21 the Court had repeatedly held that the issue of legislative apportionment was not a matter for judicial determination
because of its political nature; 22 the Court viewed the matter as constithe Council.
Initiative 144 differed somewhat from the other two proposals in that it provided
for non-partisan elections and four-year terms and compensation of $4.000 per annum
for legislative services.
16. See note 15 supra.
17. See note 6 supra.
18. 369 U.S. 186(1962).
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. Prior to the Court's decision in Reynolds, but after Baker, adoption of the
federal analogy was believed by some states to be a convenient method of circumventing the requirement that both houses of a legislature be apportioned on the basis
of population. In the two years between the cases at least 13 states attempted to adopt
the "federal plan" in their state constitutions. See Everson & Hamilton. Current Bases
of Representation and the "Federal Plan," in LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT KEY TO
POWER 97, 101 (H. Hamilton ed. 1964).
Modern authorities in considering the appropriateness of the "federal analogy" in
state legislatures, usually conclude that it is inapposite at the state level. See generally
R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT AND THE FEDERAL ANALOGY (1962); H. WALKER, THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 172 et seq. (1948); Rhyne. The Progeny of Baker v. Carr. in
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, supra at 64. 68; McKay, The Federal Analogy and
State Apportionment Standards, 38 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 487 (1963).

21. 369 U.S. 186(1962).
22. The seminal case holding that reapportionment was a political rather than
constitutional issue was Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Justice Frankfurter, writing a plurality opinion for three members of the Court. stated that reapportionment was a "political thicket" into which the courts should not venture.
Id. at 556. Three dissenters, represented by Justice Black, maintained that a constitutional rather than a political issue was involved, and argued that the Illinois apportionment statute in question constituted a denial of equal protection. because unequal
weight was given to each vote. Justice Rutledge, the swing vote in Colegrove, agreed
with the dissenters that the reapportionment issue was in fact a justiciable matter, but

906

A Proposal for Unicameralism
tutionally within the exclusive ambit of the legislative branch of government. 23 These rulings applied to both federal and state legislative
24
apportionment.
Although Baker did not explicitly provide for judicial legislative
reapportionment, it effectively swept away justiciability barriers that
had formerly barred judicial involvement in the apportionment issue.25 By ruling that federal district courts havd jurisdiction over such
voted to dismiss for an unrelated reason. Although Colegrove was only a plurality
opinion, it became a precedent relied upon for the proposition that the reapportionment
question was a political rather than a constitutional issue. See, e.g., Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956) (per curiam); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952)
(per curiam); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (per curiam); MacDougall v.
Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (per curiam). The Colegrove rationale has been applied
to both state legislative and congressional districting. Compare, e.g., MacDougall v.
Green, supra (state legislative districts) with Kidd v. McCanless, supra (congressional

districts).
The failure to reapportion legislative districts, coupled with the increased migration
of Americans from rural to urban areas, resulted in continued overrepresentation of
rural areas and underrepresentation of urban regions. See generally P. DAVID & R.
EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN & SUBURBAN VOTE (1961). Colegrove and its

progeny prevented resort to the judiciary for relief from malapportionment, and state
legislatures balked at altering legislative districts because such change would deprive
some legislators of their seats. As a result, the disparity in population between legislative districts in some states was astounding. By 1961, for example, the largest state
senatorial district in California contained 6,038,771 people, while the smallest contained 14,294. Theoretically 10.7% of the population of the state could have elected
a majority of the state senate. Similarly, the largest house district in Vermont contained 33,155 people, while the smallest contained 38; theoretically 11.6% of the
voters of Vermont could have elected a majority of the Vermont house. NATIONAL
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (1962). See also
Colegrove v. Green, supra at 557 (app. I).
23. As the Colegrove plurality stated:
The short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive
authority to secure fair representation by the States in the popular House and left
to that House determination whether States have fulfilled their responsibility. If
Congress failed in exercising its powers, whereby standards of fairness are offended, the remedy ultimately lies with the people. Whether Congress faithfully
discharges its duty or not, the subject has been committed to the exclusive control
of Congress. An aspect of government from which the judiciary . . . has been
excluded by the clear intention of the Constitution cannot be entered by the fed•eral courts because Congress may have been in default in exacting from States
obedience to its mandate.
328 U.S. at 554.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. Plaintiffs in Baker challenged a 1901 Tennessee statute, apportioning the
state General Assembly, on the basis of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. The complaint alleged that it was "difficult or impossible" to alter the present
apportionment, either by enacting another statute or a state constitutional amendment, because of the composition of the legislature, which was based on the apportionment statute in issue. Id. at 186. The district court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction and because no claim was stated upon which relief could be granted.
Reversal of the district court dismissal did not embroil the Supreme Court in the
substantive equal protection claim. The Baker Court only removed any questions of
justiciability from the controversy by resolving the standing, jurisdictional, and
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matters, and that the reapportionment question is not such a political
issue as to preclude judicial intervention, the Court laid a foundation
for attacks on legislative apportionment based on the equal protection clause. 2 6 The tenor of this judicial involvement was delineated
two years later in 1964.
Reynolds was one of six apportionment cases decided simultaneously in 1964.27 In each case the state legislative apportionment was
struck down as contrary to the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. Reynolds, the most definitive of the six opinions, established two key propositions. First, the Court articulated the "one man,
28
one vote" principle:
[W] e conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state
legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence
impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because
he lives in the city or on the farm. This is the clear and strong command of our Constitution's Equal Protection Clause ...
Second, the Court held that both houses of a bicameral state legisla"'political question" issues in favor of the plaintiffs. See McKay. Reapportionment:
Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 223 (1968).
26. After distinguishing the jurisdictional from the justiciability issue, the Court
noted that Colegrove and the per curiam opinions based on it were not dismissed for
lack ofjurisdiction. 369 U.S. at 202-03.
The more pressing issue before the Court was circumventing the long-established
"political question" doctrine. The Court rejected the nonjusticiable political question
conclusion by distinguishing a claim based on the guaranty clause, U.S. CONST.. art.
IV, § 4. and one based on the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The
Court admitted that the guaranty clause "is not a repository of judicially manageable
standards which a court could utilize independently in order to identify a State's
lawful government." 369 U.S. at 223. The Court then noted, however, that " [j] udicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar." Id. at
226. Because the appellants' claim was based on the equal protection clause rather
than the guaranty clause, the Court determined that the "political question" doctrine
which precluded judicial intervention in a guaranty clause cause of action had no
application to a claim based on the equal protection clause.
27. Reynolds involved a challenge to both the existing and a legislatively proposed
substitute apportionment of legislative districts in Alabama. The existing legislative
apportionment was based on a 1901 statute. The comparison cases were: Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assem. of Colo.. 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Davis v. Mann. 377 U.S. 678 (1964)
(Virginia); Maryland Comm. for Fair Rep. v. Tawes. 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo. 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York). The Reynolds requirement of apportionment was imposed on federal congressional districts in Wesberry v.
Sanders. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
28. 377 U.S. at 566-68.
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ture must be apportioned according to population. It explicitly found
any analogy of a state to the federal legislature "inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting schemes," and "little more than an
after-the-fact rationalization offered in defense of maladjusted state
apportionment arrangements ....
"29 The Court, however, suggested
in dictum that bicameral legislatures remained desirable. According to
Chief Justice Warren, bicameralism would continue to provide useful
functions because the size and composition of the legislative bodies
could be sufficiently different to provide enhahced deliberation and
30
differing perspectives.
There were two important reactions among the states to the Reynolds decision. First, for at least fifteen states whose legislatures were
based on the federal model, Reynolds required a reorganization of
one house of the state legislature.3 1 For'the majority of states (in-

cluding Washington), 32 however, population had been the original

basis for apportioning representation in both houses of the legislature.3 3 Thus, the second and most far-reaching consequence of the case
was the sudden and widespread legislative reapportionments it engendered. By 1966 --rtually every state in the Union had been reappor29. Id. at 573.
30. ChiefJustice Warren stated:
We do not believe that the concept of bicameralism is rendered anachronistic
and meaningless when the predominant basis of representation in the two state
legislative bodies is required to be the same-population. A prime reason for bicameralism, modernly considered, is to insure mature and deliberate consideration
of, and to prevent precipitate action on, proposed legislative measures. Simply
because the controlling criterion for apportioning representation is required to be
the same in both houses does not mean that there will be no differences in the
composition and complexion of the two bodies. Different constituencies can be
represented in the two houses. One body could be composed of single-member
districts while the other could have at least some multimember districts. The
length of terms of the legislators in the separate bodies could differ. The numerical size of the two bodies could be made to differ, even significantly, and the
geographical size of districts from which legislators are elected could also be
made to differ. . . . In summary, these and other factors could be, and are
presently in many States, utilized to engender differing complexions and collective attitudes in the two bodies of a state legislature, although both are apportioned substantially on a population basis.
Id. at 576-77 (dictum).
31. Prior to Reynolds, in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
and South Dakota, one house of the state legislature was based on population and the
other on fixed districts. In Delaware both houses of the legislature were based on fixed
districts. See Everson & Hamilton, Current Bases of Representation and the "Federal
Plan," in LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, supra note 20, at 97.
32. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 3.
33. Everson & Hamilton, CurrentBases of Representation and the "Federal Plan,"
in LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, supranote 20, at 97.
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tioned, by the legislature, by court decision, or by other means. 34 In
Washington, the state constitution mandates the legislature to reapportion its districts every 10 years. 35 Nonetheless, the legislature has
repeatedly failed to carry out its constitutional mandate as it has twice
been directed by a federal district court to reapportion itself in conformity with the principles of Reynolds.3 6 In the most recent case the
state legislature was unable to fulfill its constitutional duty and instead
relied on the federal courts to draw up a legislative redistricting
plan. 37 Thus, although the Washington legislative district plan cur-

rently conforms with the Reynolds requirements, this result was
achieved despite, rather than because of, positive action on the part of
the state legislature.
Because both houses of the Washington legislature have always
been based upon population, the Reynolds' rejection of the federal
analogy has little direct effect on it. The impact of Baker and Reynolds is important in the State of Washington, however, for several
reasons. First, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Reynolds reveals that
the governmental institutions and the structural policies appropriate
on the federal level may not be so on the state level where different
considerations apply. Second, the Washington legislature's manner of
dealing with reapportionment reveals the degree to which self-interest
comes into play when substantial structural alteration of the legisla34.

BOYD,

See generally W.

CONGRESSIONAL

QUARTERLY

CHANGING

SERVICE,

PATTERNS

REPRESENTATION

OF

APPORTIONMENT

AND

APPORTIONMENT

(1965):
65-85

(1966) (state-by-state analysis as of 1966); W. CRANE & M. WATTS, STATE LEGISLATIVE

SYSTEMS
NATIONAL

28-31

(1968)

MUNICIPAL

(delineates principal
LEAGUE,

LEGISLATIVE

means

of state

REDISTRICTING

BY

reapportionment);
NON-LEGISLATIVE

AGENCIES (1967). Other means include reapportionment by initiative as occured in
Washington in 1930 and 1956. See note 36 infra.
35.

WASH. CONST. art. II, § 3.

36. Since statehood in 1889 the legislature has succeeded in reapportioning itself
without the aid of an initiative or court suit only once, in 1901. INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, THE LEGISLATURE AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE STATE

OF WASHINGTON 11 (1974). Despite legislative attempts to alter it. a 1930 initiative
(Initiative No. 57) reapportioned the legislature. Id. at 11-12. The initiative process
was again utilized in 1956 in an attempt to reapportion the legislature. A 1952 amendment to the Washington Constitution. however, empowered the legislature to amend
any initiative passed by the people. WASH. CONST. art. II,§ 41. Utilizing this amendment, the Washington legislature emasculated the intent of the reapportionment
initiative by substantially revising the 1956 measure.
For a more extended discussion see G. BAKER, THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT
STATE (1960); INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH. supra, at

IN WASHINGTON

10-12; McDermott, Judicial Sanctions and Legislative Redistricting in Washington
State, 45 WASH. L. REV. 681 (1970). For a discussion of these cases and the role of
self-interest in reapportionment see notes 120-28 and accompanying text infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
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ture is potentially involved. Third, and most importantly, the reapportionment cases challenge the need for a bicameral legislature. When
both legislative houses are based on population, it may be questionable whether they can be sufficiently different to provide a fresh
"second look" at legislation. As suggested below 38 the diminution of
this "second look" function makes the added confusion, time, and
expense which the second house entails more difficult to justify.
III.

SPECIFIC ADVANTAGES OF UNICAMERALISM IN
WASHINGTON 39

Although it is difficult to treat each desirable aspect of unicameralism independently of the other favorable factors, 40 the following
reasons for adopting a unicameral system in Washington can be advanced.
38. See notes 87-92 and accompanying text infra.
39. As a background to the discussion of advantages of a unicameral legislature
in Washington, it is useful to describe briefly the present structure of the Washington
bicameral legislature. The house of representatives currently consists of 98 memberstwo representatives elected from each of the 49 legislative districts for two-year terms.
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 5 (as apportioned by Prince v. Kramer, Civil No. 9668
(W.D. Wash., April 21, 1972), aff'd sub non., AFL-CIO v. Prince, 409 U.S. 808
(1972)). The senate consists of 49 members--one senator elected from each district
for a four-year term; half of the senators stand for election every two years. WASH.
CONST. art. II, § 6.

Regular sessions of the legislature are held biannually in odd-numbered years for
a period not to exceed 60 days. Id., § 12; WASH. REV. CODE § 44.04.010 (1974). An
extraordinary session beyond the 60-day regular session must be called by the gov,ernor. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 7. Such extraordinary sessions have become the rule
"rather than the exception: since 1951, every regular session except that of 1957 has
been followed by at least one extraordinary session; in every even-numbered year
since 1970 an extraordinary session has been necessary. See note 43 infra.
Seventeen standing committees exist in each house of the Washington legislature.
INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 27-28. Under the "contin-

uing session" concept, each standing committee continues to meet once a month while
the legislature is not in session as an interim committee. Engrossed S.C. Res. 125,
Rule 36-41, 43d [Wash. State] Legis., 1st Ex. Sess. (1973); S.C. Res. 134, Rule 28,
43d [Wash. State] Legis., Ist Ex. Sess. (1973). These committees conduct hearings
and submit legislation for consideration in the following legislative session. See note 3
supra. See also LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF WASHINGTON, THE WASHINGTON STATE
LEGISLATURE: CONTINUING STUDY AND A LOOK AT THE UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE 1-5

(1975).
40. The Nebraska experience provides the best analytical basis to the advantages
of unicameralism as a whole. As an oddity in the United States, it has been the subject
of considerable research. See generally A. BRECKINRIDGE, ONE HOUSE FOR Two 62-64

(1957); A. JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 178-87; Riley, NonPartisan UnicameralBenefits, Defects Re-examined, 52 NEB. L. REV. 377 (1973); Srb, Tile Unicameral
Legislature--A Successful Innovation, 40 NEB. L. REV. 626 (1961).
Nebraska's present legislature has 49 members elected for staggered four-year terms
on a nonpartisan basis. Its procedural rules are relatively simple: there is no time
limitation upon sessions, there is a limited time period in which bills may be intro-
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1. The part-time bicameral legislature is no longer a reasonable
mechanism for performing the legislative function in Washington. By
adopting a unicameral legislature, Washington could recognize that a
legislative seat is a full-time position, to which a legislator should devote the majority of his or her time, and for which a legislator should
be paid an adequate salary.
2. A unicameral legislature would be less expensive for the taxpayers and would be more efficient and effective in its consideration
of legislation. For the same level of current expenditure for the bicameral legislature, Washington could adopt a unicameral legislature
and facilitate legislative performance by concentrating responsibility
in one house. 41 Interhouse rivalry and deadlocks would be eliminated
duced. and a certain period must intervene before the passage of a bill into law. The
committee structure is clear, and research facilities are generally available to members.
See Srb. sutpra at 627-633. The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures ranked
Nebraska ninth overall and gave it the following ratings in particular legislative areas:
Accountability (1); Informed (16); Representative (18); Independent (30); and
Functional (35). CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, THE SOMETIMES
GOVERNMENTS 251-53 (1971).
It should be noted that the Nebraska system does not represent the only. or even
the ideal, unicameral legislative body. The unicameral legislature proposed herein
differs in a number of aspects from that of Nebraska. most notably in the preservation
of the partisan system.
41. In the present context, the terms "'effectiveness" and "efficiency" are difficult to
define because they are such value-laden concepts. In the authors' view. however.
legislative effectiveness or efficiency comprehends an ability to produce well-considered
legislation, reflective of the constituency's desires and needs, in a reasonable amount
of time. Thus, an effective legislature should produce the following results:
1)promulgation of needed legislation;
2) budget control;
3) supervision of administration of legislative programs;
4) investigatory powers;
5) planning for future needs and contingencies.
The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures addressed the issues of legislative
effectiveness and efficiency as follows:
If it is going to represent its people and make authoratative decisions on their
behalf, a legislature must carry on a number of basic activities: it must put programs together, evaluate ongoing programs. deliberate on various problems and
proposals. reach accommodations among contending views, educate the public
and itself on important questions, and, by doing all these things, make public
policy. No legislature can do these things unless it has:
-enough time and the means to make good use of its time;
-staff aides for leaders and individual members beyond the more specialized
staff of clerk's or research offices;
-adequate facilities, including chambers. committee rooms, and offices;
-manageable
size, in terms of the total number of members, the number of
committees, and the number of committee assignments per member;
-an organizational structure and a set of procedures that speed, rather than
impede, the flow of work;
-some
method for ensuring continuity between legislative sessions and coordination between the houses of the legislature; and
-an orderly atmosphere, a sense of decorum and dignity of office that enables
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and parallel efforts in drafting, debate, and committee investigation
would no longer be required.
3. For the same amount of money currently spent on the bicameral
legislature, the staff serving a unicameral legislature could be larger
42
and more comprehensive.
4. A unicameral body would be more accountable and would inhibit the influence of "special interests" by concentrating public attention upon one body. Responsibility could not be shifted to the other
house and popular awareness of legislative progress would be enhanced because media coverage would be aided. Conference committees, too often acting as impediments to the enactment of legislation,
would no longer exist.
A.

The Time and FinancialLimitations of the Bicameral
Legislature

An analysis of the current Washington bicameral legislature reveals
that it has become increasingly time consuming and decreasingly feasible in a financial sense for its members. For the decades beginning in
1927, 1937, and 1947, for example, the legislative sessions averaged
68, 61, and 69 days, respectively. 43 For the decade beginning in 1957
the legislature to conduct its business without undue delay or disruption, and with
a sense of competency and authority.
CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 40, at 57.

42.
43.

Id. at 62-64, 113-116, 164-65.
Length of legislative sessions since 1927 have been as follows:
Total Days
Session
Regular
Extra
in Session
1927
60
60
1929
60
60
1931
60
60
1933-34
60
40
100
1935
60
60
1937
60
60

1939

60

1941
1943-44
1945
1947

60
60
60
60

1949
1951
1953

60
60
60

5
10,9
9

65
79
69

1955

60

14

74

1957
1959

60
60

15

60
75

1961
1963

60
60

22
23

82
83

60
6

60
66
60
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the average was 83 days. 44 From 1967 to the present, however, sessions have averaged 161 days. 45 The 44th legislature set a new record
46
for longevity, lasting 231 days.
Compounding the problem of time consumption are the demands
required by interim committee assignments. 47 Committees, directed to
meet once a month while the legislature is not in session, require approximately 48 days per biennium for each legislator, in addition to
the time demands made by the regular and extraordinary sessions of
48
the legislature.
The fact that the regular session of the legislature ordinarily meets
only every other year, further exaggerates the problem of time consumption. Because of this requirement the time demands made upon
legislators are not split evenly from year to year. Rather, the legislator
must be prepared to spend a disproportionate amount of time in the
legislature every odd-numbered year. In the 1975-77 biennium, for
example, the legislature spent 231 days in session to date.4 9 Of this
time, 155 days occurred in 1975, and only 76 days in 1976.50
These figures suggest that prior to 1965, serving as a legislator was
indeed a part-time task: legislative sessions occupied 60-80 days per
1965
60
54
114
1967
60
52
112
1969-70
60
60.32
152
1971-72
60
60.44
164
1973-74
60
38. 8.41
147
1975-76
60
88. 7.76
231
All figures, except those for the Second and Third Extraordinary Sessions 1975-76. are
taken from [Wash. State] H. JouR. 1927-76; figures for the Second Extraordinary
Session are taken from the Seattle Times. Mar. 21, 1976. § A. at 1. col. 1: and figures
for the Third Extraordinary Session are taken from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
Mar. 27. 1976, § A, at 1. col. 5.
44.

See note 43 supra.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See note 39 supra.
48. Chief Clerk of the House of Representatives Dean R. Foster estimates that
an average legislator attended committee meetings or "closely related legislative matters" three to five times per month between 1973 and 1975. Letter from Dean R. Foster to co-author, Dec. 8. 1975, on file with the Washington Law Review. The figure
utilized in the text is derived from an average of four days per month per legislator.
Interim committees meet when the legislature is not in session. No legislature has
met more often than the 44th Legislature which has been in session 231 days in this
biennium so far. There are, therefore, approximately twelve months during a biennium
in which the legislature is not in session and interim meetings are required.
If the interim committees meet four days per month and such monthly meetings
occur twelve times during a biennium. 48 days would appear to be a proper and conservative estimate.
49. See note 43 supra.
50. Id.
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biennium; 5 1 few extraordinary sessions were called; 52 fewer interim
committees existed to occupy the legislator's time between sessions; 5 3
and the largest state budget with which the legislature worked totaled
less than $1.8 billion. 54 Since 1967, however, legislative sessions have
averaged twice their prior length per biennium; 55 three to five days
per month are required by interim committee meetings; 56 the state
budget has ballooned to $6.8 billion per biennium; 57 and the legislators are faced with increasingly complex issues. 58 These demands together with the irregular schedules leave the legislator little time for
outside business. In short, acting as a legislator is no longer a parttime avocation; it is rapidly becoming a full-time position.
While the time demands placed on legislators have greatly increased, their compensation has remained minimal: $3,800 per year
in salary, plus $40 per day spent in session or on legislative business. 5 9
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Interim committees did not come into existence until 1973. See note 39 supra.
Certain statutory committees have existed, however, during the period between the
regular sessions, of the legislature in the past. These statutory committees still exist.
See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 44.28 (1974) (Legislative Budget Committee); id. ch. 44.30
(Joint Committee on Higher Education); id. ch. 44.33 (Joint Committee on Education); id. ch. 44.36 (Joint Committee on Urban Area Government); id. ch. 44.39
(Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy); id. ch. 44.40 (Legislative Transportation Committee).
54. In the 1963-65 biennium the state budget totaled $1,795,615,612. STATE OF
WASHINGTON, BUDGET FOR THE 1967-1969 FISCAL BIENNIUM PART I: BUDGET MESSAGE
OF GOVERNOR DANIEL J. EVANS TO THE FORTIETH LEGISLATURE 41 (Submitted by Gov.

D. Evans 1967).
55. See note 43 supra.
56. See note 48 supra.
57. The estimated budget for the 1975-77 biennium is $6,783,300,000. STATE OF
WASHINGTON, BUDGET MESSAGE 12 (Submitted by Gov. D. Evans 1974).

58. See Part III-B infra.
59. The compensation structure for members of the Washington legislature is
complex and reflects the desire of the members to achieve adequate compensation by
whatever means possible. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.03.010 (1974) is the basic compensation statute for legislators. It provides for salaries of $3,800 annually and ten cents
per mile for travel to and from legislative sessions. Salaries had been $1,200 per year
until 1965 when they were raised to $3,600 per annum. In 1973, the legislature sought
to increase salaries from $3,600 per year to $10,560 annually. Ch. 137, § 110 [1973)
Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 937. The people, by Initiative 282, Ch. 149, § 1 [1974] Wash.
Laws, 3d Ex. Sess. 513, succeeded in rolling back the increase to $3,800 per year. The
courts upheld that result.
In State ex rel. Helm v. Kramer, 82 Wn. 2d 307, 510 P.2d 1110 (1973), the court
held that the salary increase statute was exempt from the referendum process as it
was "necessary for the support of state government," one of two exceptions to the
popular referendum authority. Id. at 312, 510 P.2d at 1718. In Yelle v. Kramer, 83
Wn. 2d 464, 520 P.2d 927 (1974), however, the court, consisting of nine justices
pro tem because the sitting justices had disqualified themselves due to personal interest,
held 7-2 that Initiative 282 was effective to roll back salary increases, that the legisla-
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Based on salary and allowances, the average annual income from official legislative activity per legislator is estimated as follows: $8,087 in
1973, $6,753 in 1974, and $11,493 in 1975.60
A comparison of estimated average income of legislators with that
of staff members highlights the inadequacy of their compensation.
Salaries for permanent staff members average $13,200,61 15 percent
higher than the compensation paid to legislators in 1975. Moreover, a
staff attorney serving in the 155 day 1975 session at an estimated $75
ture did not have the sole power to alter compensation for its members. and that the
initiative was not a referendum in disguise that fell within Helm.
The 44th legislature, in its 1976 extraordinary session, again raised legislative
salaries, this time from $3,800 to $7,200 per annum. Ch. 113, § 1 [ 1975-76] Wash.
Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 326. Referendum 38 sought to roll back this increase also, but was
unsuccessful in obtaining the requisite number of signatures to be placed on the ballot.
In addition, WASH. REV. CODE § 44.04.080 (1974) allows members a per diem
allowance of $40 per day "in lieu of subsistence and lodging during and while attending any legislative session." Id. Per diem allowances are paid every day during
the session even when the legislature is adjourned (such as on Sundays). Prior tc
1941, legislators had to submit expense documentation before receiving a per diem
allowance, but id. § 44.04.090 provides that legislators need not itemize expenses
incurred to receive the $40 per diem. A change in the per diem rate in 1969 was subjected to court challenge on the grounds that it violated the provision of WASH. CONST.
art. 28, § 1, which prohibited increases in compensation during the term of office of
legislators and other state officers. In Hoppe v. State, 78 Wn. 2d 164, 469 P.2d 909
(1970), however, the Washington Supreme Court held that the increase in per diem
allowance from $25 to $40 was valid as per diem allowances and was not "compensation" within the meaning of WASH. CONST. art. 28, § I, and was necessary given
the increasing responsibility and efforts of legislators.
WASH. REV. CODE § 44.04.120 (1970) also provides that members of the legislature
receive a per diem of $40 while serving on official legislative business during the time
period between sessions and that members receive mileage expenses of 13 cents per mile
as provided in id. § 43.03.060 for travel to such business meetings.
60. Average legislative yearly income for members of the Washington State
House of Representatives is estimated as follows:

Salary
Per diem sessions
Per diem interim
Travel
Air fare and cars
paid directly
Total

1973
$3,600
3,440
722
193
132

1974
$3,600
1,640
1,090
331
92

1975
$3,600
6,200
903
485
305

$8,087

S6.753

$11,493

Letter from Dean R. Foster to co-author, April 27, 1976, on file with the Washington
Law Review. Because salary and allowances are similar, Senate incomes should be
comparable.
There is some problem with the reliability of any figures for average legislative
compensation. Any figures suggested must be considered estimates at best. For example,
for 1973 the League of Women Voters estimated that the average legislative compensation was approximately $8,700. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF WASHINGTON,
supra note 39, at 6.
61. Letter from Dean R. Foster to co-author, Sept. 11, 1975, on file with the
Washington Law Review.
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per day per diem would have received $11,625.62 In this fashion,
some employees of the legislature are currently receiving more pay
63
than the legislators.
Perhaps the principal consequence of the rapid increase in length of
legislative sessions, together with the lack of any proportional increase
in legislative pay, has been the loss of experienced and dedicated legislators in a significant turnover in legislative membership. 64 The present structure increasingly appears to preclude candidates who have
no outside sources of income, or whose employment does not allow
long periods of absence, from running for office, while it encourages
those candidates who are independently wealthy or in an occupation
which allows long periods of absence. 65 As early as March 1976, five
62. Chief Clerk of the House Dean R. Foster estimates $75 per diem as the average
amount paid an attorney employed by the house of representatives. Letter from Dean
R. Foster to co-author, Oct. 24, 1975.
63. The predicament of the typical legislator is indicated by the following comment
of one Washington state senator:
The public complains about our salary and per diem. Hell! I'm in partnership
with another lawyer and it costs us about $100 a day just to open the office and
pay the secretaries. In spite of this we net $2,500 per month. While I am in
Olympia my law partner must do all the work, our profit is cut in half, and I'm
paid $300 per month and $40 per day. On top of that I have to run back and
forth to my office or court at least once a week when We're in session. I figure that
in a ninety day session I lose about $1,500 to $2,000.
Reply of anonymous legislator to authors' poll, Appendix A infra.
64. Membership changes appeared to coincide with two major events: the success
of the initiative to roll back legislative pay increases and the enactment of the Public
Disclosure Act, WASH. REv. CODE §§ 42.17.010 et seq. (1974). Legislative representation-from groups whose business required substantial attention or confidentiality such
as attorneys was significantly affected. In 1971, before the salary roll-back or the
Public Disclosure Act, there were 36 lawyers in the legislature. See generally STATE OF
WASHINGTON, LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 313-26, 383-400 (1971). By 1973, the number

had decreased to 23, id. 326-41, 394-410 (1973), and the present 44th Legislature
elected in 1975 contains only 14 attorneys. Id. 332-48, 404-22 (1975). There are
significantly more legislators who identify themselves as business people, housewives,
or workers in state and local government.
65. One commentator in examining salary levels in state legislatures stated:
The low level of legislative salaries is-like the restrictions on length and frequency of session-a legacy from earlier eras in our history when the task of
representing one's friends and neighbors in the legislature was considered a patiiotic duty, comparable to serving in the army or on ajury ....
In all but a handful of today's legislatures, salaries and* other compensation
remain at nineteenth century levels. Legislative service, as a result, is closed to
all but a tiny fraction of our people. Legislative salaries and compensation should
be high enough to enable a broad cross-section of the citizenry--of different
races, sexes, occupations, economic circumstances-to consider legislative service.
Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, supranote 40, at 137-38 (1971).
The Citizens Conference also suggests that the "citizen legislature/professional
legislature" distinction is spurious in this context: "We need both the representativeness
and independence that is implied in a citizen legislature and the- competency and skill
implied in a professional legislature." Id. at 138.
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state legislators had indicated that they would not seek re-election in
1976, citing poor salaries and an inability to maintain their full-time
jobs as reasons for their retirement. 6 6 Numerous other legislators also
have been forced to take time from the legislative session to take care
of outside business. 6 7 Continuation of the present part-time system
68
will not discourage this trend.
Adoption of a unicameral legislature in Washington can help to alleviate the problems of time consumption and inadequate pay. An
appropriate plan should recognize that a legislative seat is becoming a
full-time position to which a legislator should devote the majority of
his time, and for which a legislator should be paid an adequate salary. 69 Instead of placing a legislator in the increasingly untenable position where he must attempt to hold down two jobs, the state should
allow him to devote all of his time and effort to legislative tasks.
Under such a plan a legislator could have an outside source of income, absent some conflict of interest, but his involvement with a
66. The five include Senator Pete Francis, and Representatives Helmut Jueling.
William Paris, Robert Perry, and William Schumaker. Representative Wayne Ehlers
states that he will run for reelection for one more term. See generally Seattle Times.
Feb. 15, 1976, § A, at 14, col. I; id. Mar. 7, 1976, § E, at 12, col. 3; id. Mar. 18, 1976,
§ B, at 3, col. 1.
67. These legislators among others include: Senators Pete Francis, James McDermott, August Mardesich, and Representatives John Bagnariol, William Paris, and
Leonard Sawyer. See note 66 supra.
68. Some companies have reacted to the inadequate salary provided legislators.
For example, members of the legislature who are employees of the Boeing Company
are entitled to choose between 1) leave without pay during legislative sessions with
retention of the legislative salary; or 2) retention of their Boeing salary with remittance by the legislators of their legislative salary to Boeing. This policy is under review
by Boeing Company. Telephone interview with Harry F. Wood, Public Affairs Research Mgr., Boeing Co., in Seattle, Wash., Jan. 5, 1976.
Such a program has received criticism. During the 1976 extraordinary session of
the legislature one Boeing employee, Representative A. N. (Bud) Shinpoch, was
singled out by other legislators as responsible for unreasonable delay in ending the
session. Senator August Mardesich suggested that Boeing Company reassess its policy
of "encouraging its employees to run for public office and pay them the difference in
their incomes between those jobs and their company salaries." Shinpoch was reported
as stating, "It makes no difference to me if we stay here all summer," presumably
because of Boeing's compensation plan. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 21, 1976, § A,
at 1, col. 3.
The policy of Boeing, also followed by other corporations and many local government units, is inherently the subject of questions of conflict of interest when members
vote on issues of importance to their principals. It is ironic that in the context of voting
by members of administrative bodies on zoning issues, courts will reverse decisions
where administrative officers or their principals had the slightest connection with the
subject considered on the grounds of "appearance of unfairness." See Flemming v.
City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972); Buell v. City of Bremerton,
80 Wn. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715. 453
P.2d 832 (1969).
69. See Proposed Constitutional Revision, Appendix B infra.
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business venture could not interfere with legislative activities.7 0 Because of the smaller size of the unicameral legislature proposed herein
(49 members, as opposed to the present 147 members), legislators'
salaries could be set at 50 percent of the governor's salary (this would
amount to $21,075 at present pay level) to provide the members an
adequate pay to devote full time to the legislature's business. 7 ' Even
with this increase in compensation, however, the state could save
72
approximately $670,000 in legislators' salaries in a biennium. Experience in Nebraska supports this prediction. The adoption of a unicameral legislature there resulted in an increase in the individual
legislator's total pay with a decrease (by half) in total expenditures for
73
legislators' salaries.
A smaller unicameral legislature which paid its members an adequate salary would also have the ancillary beiefit of enhancing the
prominence and prestige of the body.7 4 Citizens with exceptional
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. This approximation can be derived by comparing projected expenses under
the proposed unicameral model with those of the 1975-76 biennium to date. The
legislature has met for a total of 231 days at the time of this writing. In addition, the
Chief Clerk of the House estimates that members attended three to five days of meetings or hearings per month and leaders spent ten to fifteen days per month on legislative business for which they were paid a per diem allowance. See note 48 supra.
Assuming legislative sessions totaling 231 days per biennium (a conservative
estimate given recent trends, see note 43 supra), per diem allowances would be paid
to an average legislator on approximately 275 occasions over the biennium. At present
pay scales ($3,800 per year in salary and $40 per day in allowances), a member of
the present House or Senate would receive an average of $18,600 in a biennium. The
cost for 147 members would be approximately $2,734,200. This figure excludes mileage
and incidental expenses for members and does not take into account the increase in
salaries for members from $3,800 to $7,200 per year. See note 39 supra.
The proposed unicameral system sets legislative salaries at 50% of the governor's
salary ($42,150 per WASH. REV. CODE § 43.03.010 (Supp. 1975)). The salary would be
$21,075 per annum with no per diem allowances or special expenses for mileage. For
a 49-member body, the cost would be $2,065,350 for the biennium.
Although this comparison constitutes only a rough approximation of average costs,
members of a unicameral body as described in Appendix B could be paid significantly
higher annual compensation than their bicameral counterparts at a major saving to
the taxpayers each biennium.
73. The cost of the 1935 regular session of the Nebraska bicameral legislature was
$202,593 for a 110-day session while the cost of the 1937 and 1939 regular sessions of
the unicameral legislature, meeting 98 and I I1 days, was respectively $103,445 and
$100,678. A. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 40, at 48.

74. The experience of Nebraska is instructive in this regard. An unusually large
number of candidates were attracted to run for the 43 seats in the unicameral assembly
in 1937; 283 candidates filed for election, of whom 122 had served previously in the
legislature. The average of 6.6 aspirants per seat compared very favorably with the
3.65 average for senatorial seats in six prior elections for the bicameral legislature. Of
those elected, 75% had some college training as compared to 45% for other state
legislatures at the time. 75% had prior legislative experience as opposed to the average
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qualifications could afford a period of legislative service, even though
their regular occupation would be temporarily set aside. Qualified individuals would not be put to the current distasteful choice of legislative service or financial difficulty.7 5 Additionally, people from a wider
range of occupational groups might be encouraged by an adequately
compensated unicameral legislature to seek legislative office; members
would not have to maintain two jobs.76 Finally, as will be explored
subsequently, 77 fuller responsibility for legislation will rest on a unicameral legislature. With fewer members and greater accountability,
more time, investigation, and planning could be devoted to the legislative process resulting in a rise in the quality of legislation and the
status of legislators.
B.

Legislative Costs and Efficiency
Statistics amply demonstrate that the Washington bicameral legisla-

of 55% in other legislatures. See generally, A.

BRECKENRIDGE, supra note

40, at 32-37;

H. SUMMERS, UNICAMERALISM IN PRACTICE 51-58 (1937).

75. At least one Washington legislator, however, believes that increased legislative
salaries would dilute the legislature's quality:
If salary, for example, is $20,000-$25,000, that doesn't make office-holders worth
that amount. Those who now serve but earn more than that amount would not,
the odds are, be candidates. So-quality of talent would be lowered.
And who would run for political office? With few exceptions, those 35 to 55
years of age with career employment would question the risk of becoming a "has
been" after 2, 4, 8, or 12 years . . . qualified for little more than a hoped-forappointment (dangers here are obvious).
Political hacks would be the order of the day. Most of us today are not trying
to make a living by getting re-elected. Let's keep that-and still seek improvements.
Reply of anonymous legislator to authors' poll, Appendix A infra.
76. Authorities in state government consider diversity within the legislature essential:
A representative legislature will reflect, to at least some degree, the important
interests and groups within the state. It will display a wide rather than narrow
range of ages; its members will have a variety of commercial and professional
backgrounds; and they will have connections with and commitments to the various
ethnic, ideological, political, and economic groups within the state. The more
drastic the restrictions on who may run or serve in the legislature, the less the
legislature will exhibit this kind of diversity.
Qualifications for office should reflect an "open admissions" policy toward legislative service. In a democracy, the only really valid qualification for serving in the
legislature is the approval of the electorate.
CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 40, at 137.
Interestingly, the experience of Nebraska in 1937 reflected a larger attraction of
candidates for office than under the bicameral system, greater legislative experience
and educational attainment than before, but no change in occupational groups from
the preceding bicameral legislature. There was no disturbance in the percentage of
occupational groups represented in the unicameral, although a number of new occupational groupings achieved representation in the unicameral body. H. SUMMERS,
supra note 74, at 53-57.
77. See Parts III-B-2 & III-B-4 infra.

920

A Proposal for Unicameralism
ture is becoming increasingly expensive.78 In the ten-year period between the 1963-65 and 1973-75 bienniums, for example, the cost of
maintaining the legislature increased from $2,429,806 to $13,039,038.79 Although the increase may be partially attributable to in-

78.

Expenditures for the Washington legislature since 1957 are as follows:
Biennium

Annual Cost

1955-57

Biennial Cost
$ 1,337,604

1957-59
1957-58
1958-59

$ 336,754
1,115,673

1,482,427

1959-61
1959-60
1960-61

432,597
1,391,149

1,823,746

1961-63
1961-62
1962-63

557,652
1,589,017

2,146,669

1963-65
1963-64
1964-65

365,707
2,064,099

2,429,806

1965-67
1965-66
1966-67

614,904
2,981,744

3,596,648

1967-69
1967-68
1968-69

1,196,749
4,608,708

5,805,457

1969-71
1969-70
1970-71

3,024,114
6,140,202

9,164,316

1971-73
1971-72
1972-73

3,890,253
6,758,792

10,649,045

1973-75
1973-74
1974-75

5,826,419
7,212,619*

13,039,038*

1975-77
1975-76
1976-77
*Estimates

7,219,198*
8,288,763*

15,507,961*

All figures taken from STATE OF WASHINGTON, BUDGETS, 1959-61 through 1975-77

biennium.
79. See note 78 supra.

921

Washington Law Review

Vol. 51: 901, 1976

flation, 80 it is apparent that the economy is not the principal reason
for the rising cost of the legislature. Rather, as service in the legislature has become more time-consuming and complex, the cost of maintaining the legislature has increased concomitantly.
Despite the expanding costs, there is no indication that the effectiveness of the legislature has increased proportionately. Indeed the
44th legislature, for example, has been criticized for being especially
ineffective. After meeting in 1975-76 for 231 days, the legislature
had still failed to deal with a number of key issues. Frequent displeasure was expressed toward the legislature's failure to deal with the
state budget and state school funding. Governor Evans called the
1976 legislature a "shoplifting" group whose budget was $38 million
in the red. 81 Many legislators have also expressed displeasure over
their inaction on the school funding issue 82 and their general inability
83
to deal with important issues facing the state.
Without increasing legislative expenditures, Washington could significantly increase the legislature's effectiveness and efficiency by
adopting a unicameral system. A unicameral legislature would improve the process of legislation because a number of functions that are
presently parallel would be limited to a single process. Fewer bills
would be drafted and introduced allowing staff members more time to
prepare legislation. 84 A single committee structure would prevail. Fi80. For the period 1965 to 1975, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that where
1967 equals 100, consumer prices increased from 94.5 in 1965 to 159.3 in May 1975,
an increase of 68.6%, while wholesale prices increased from 96.6 in 1965 to 172.1 in
April 1975, an increase of 78.2%. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1975, at 417, 422.

81. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Apr. 7, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 5.
82. When asked why they were still in Olympia on the seventieth day of the 1976
session (that was supposed to have lasted 35 days), legislators responded as follows:
"Because we haven't solved the school-financing problem. The whole darned
system is slow and deliberative."
"I guess the reason we're still here is that we're looking for an easy answer to
a tough problem. Everyone is trying to find out what to do about the (school)
levy problem without additional sources of revenue. And I don't think that's
possible."
"I'm still here because those responsible for coming to agreement on the budget
and school funding haven't been able to agree."
Seattle Times, Mar. 21, 1976, § A, at 11, col. I.
83. See generally The Daily Olympian, Feb. 10, 1976, § A, at 4, col. 5; Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, July 21, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1; Seattle Times, Mar. 23, 1976, § A,
at 12, col. 1; id., Mar. 21, 1976, § A, at 11, col. 1; id., Feb. 5, 1976, § A, at 8, col. 1;
id., July 19, 1975, § A, at 3, col. 1.
84. The legislative staff could also devote its energy to other than purely legislative
matters. The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, for example, made the following recommendation for Washington:
A significant part of the legislature's ability to exercise oversight over executive
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nally, a larger percentage of bills would be enacted into law.8 5
In addition to the elimination of needless duplication in the legislative process, efficiency should be enhanced in a unicameral system
because of the greater responsibility placed on individual legislators.
The greater attention to program details and consequences which
ideally should result from adoption of a unicameral legislature is reflected in one commentator's description of thd operation of the Ne86
braska system:
When the bill is considered in committee of the whole the assembly,
being a small deliberative body, does not give rubber-stamp approval
to the work of the standing committee but debates the measure and
attempts to arrive at a clear-cut decision. Likewise the vote on passage
departments and administrative agencies depends upon the power and capacity
to conduct audits (financial and functional) of these units of the state government.
These functions and responsibilities should be removed from the duties and resources of the office of the auditor and should be established under a legislative
auditor.
CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 40, at 167.

The Washington legislature currently has a statutory budget committee and office of
the auditor. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 44.28.060-.140 (Supp. 1975). See generally INSTITUTE
OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 46, at 37-40. The legislative auditor, however, does not have adequate authority to provide the legislature with an independent
assessment of the executive budget or the auditing of expenditure effectiveness once
the money has been appropriated. WASH. REv. CODE § 44.28.140 (Supp. 1975).
85. When Nebraska's legislature was changed from bicameral to unicameral in
1937, the percentage of bills passed increased significantly:
BICAMERAL REGULAR SESSIONS
Year

Bills Introduced

Bills'Passed

1931
1933
1935

872
1082
1056

164
163
192

Year

UNICAMERAL REGULAR SESSIONS
Bills Introduced
Bills Passed

%
18.8
15.0
18.2
%

1937
1939

581
523

214
138

36.8
26.4

1955

559

354

63.3

A. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 40, at 29. More recently, one of every two bills became
law in the unicameral legislature. Formerly, one of four became law under the bicameral legislature. D'Alemberte & Fishburne, The Unicameral Legislature, supra
note 5, at 362.
The percentage of bills passed in Washington in 1969 was just over 25% (429 bills
passed of 1,682 introduced). J. BEST, THE WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK

29 (1971). In the 1975 Regular and First Extraordinary Session the percentage
dropped to 17.5% (416 bills passed of 2,379 introduced). STATE OF WASHINGTON,
LEGISLATIVE REPORT OF THE 44TH REGULAR AND IST EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS i (1975).
86. J. SENNING, THE ONE-HouSE LEGISLATURE 82-83 (1937) [hereinafter 6ited'as
J. SENNING].
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is final; it cannot be reversed by a second house or be subjected to the
action of a conference committee. Each step of the enactment of a bill
into law is simple, responsible and open to the scrutiny of the people
of the state. Lastly the bill is sent to the governor for his signature.
The measure has been carefully drawn, checked in the standing committee, debated in committee of the whole and rechecked in its entirety by an expert on statutory form. The technical defects and unconstitutional provisions which have been the subject of the majority of
veto messages in the past are eliminated ....

Thus, the unicameral legislature can achieve substantially greater efficiency without a corresponding dilution of scrutiny.
Proponents of bicameral legislatures suggest that the benefits of
their composition and size more than counterbalance any enhanced
efficiency under the unicameral model. Bicameral advocates frequently assert that a second chamber in the legislature is a necessary
check to hasty, ill-conceived legislation. 87 Two considerations undermine this conclusion in Washington. First, both houses of the state
legislature are apportioned on the basis of population. Indeed, representatives and senators in Washington are elected from identical districts. In addition, both houses operate as independent initiators of
legislation and as overseers of the legislation of the other, i.e., they are
functionally similar. 88 With coincidental constituencies and similar
functions the houses of the Washington legislature lack the requisite
creative tension to provide a meaningful second look at legislation.
Studies in other states with analogous legislative arrangements suggest
the lack of an effective system of checks and balances where both
houses are structurally and functionally identical. 8 9 Thus, the bases
87. One legislator described his view of the present process in these terms:
I feel it is absolutely essential to maintain two houses. I've put in 4 terms, 2 as
minority, 2 as majority; I chair a sensitive and essential committee, and I'm satisfied that now and again we pass garbage (like it or not, it happens) and the Senate
catches it frequently (not always)-and we catch their garbage--and lots of it.
Our committee does research in conjunction with the Senate-and independently
also. The give and take of competition and the diverse approaches to a common
problem that two independent committees bring far overrides the time and effort
overlap.
Reply of anonymous legislator to authors' poll, Appendix A infra. See also text
accompanying note 119 infra for a similar response by another legislator.
88. See Part III-A supra.
89. Several commentators, examining different state legislatures, have observed
the lack of any checks and balances between the two houses of a bicameral legislature.
In Alabama, for example, one commentator observed:
[RIelations between the two houses are rarely disturbed. The two think alike on
most matters, and act in harmony. The fact that so many senators have had
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for the continued justification of bicameralism suggested by the Supreme Court in Reynolds does not exist in Washington. 90 There is no
second look in a classical sense. 91 The only demonstrable effect of
bicameralism in these circumstances is the protraction of the legislative

process.
Second, the state governmental structure can possess other safeguards to prevent passage of ill-conceived legislation. The veto power
of the governor, the power of the people to call for referenda, the

power of the judiciary to review legislation, and the legislature's own

92
increased accountability to the electorate under the proposed system
would provide adequate safeguards.
Proponents of bicameralism have also argued that a smaller unicameral body would alterjhe ability of the legislature to effectively employ its committee system for want of legislators. 93 The unicameral
body proposed herein would have 49 members, which is the present
size of the Senate. There should be no greater difficulty encountered
under this arrangement for filling committee posts than presently exists in the Senate. 94 In Nebraska, unicameralism figured in a major

earlier service in the House doubtless has something to do with this. More important, however, is the fact that there is no real difference in background or in
point of view between the Senate and House of Representatives. The bicameral
system in Alabama has thus become nothing more than a tradition or, more
accurately, a habit.
Hagan, The Bicameral Principle in State Legislatures, 11 J. PUB. L. 310, 315-16
(1962), quoting H. FARMER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN ALABAMA 304-05 (1949).

Similar remarks are made about New York State:
[A] ctive political parties, social relationships, similar constituencies and common
interests... all work to reduce conflict between houses of the legislature to the
point where checks and balances are more effective for reasons totally unconnected with the theoretical views on bicameralism.
Comment, A Unicameral Legislature in New York: A Review and A Proposal,supra
note 7, at 320. Another observer notes that in general the party membership of
legislators, the end of the session rush, and the influence of lobbyists tend to limit
the validity of the second house check on legislation. J. SENNING, supra note 86, at
29-32.
The unicameral legislature in Nebraska was found to be at least as effective a check
on hasty legislation as most bicameral systems. Bills in Nebraska are given longer
consideration by the legislature and are amended more frequently than was true in
the bicameral legislature. H. SUMMERS, supra note 74,-at 93-106.
90. See note 30 supra.
91, See note 6 supra.
92. See text accompanying notes 102-08 infra.
93. As one legislator stated: "[W] ith only 49 members you have a very small
talent pool to draw from for leadership, chairmanships and the normal expertise and
work load required of a legislature." Response of a legislator to authors' poll (on file
with the Washington Law Review).
94. In the 1975 legislature, there were 17 identical standing committees in the
House and Senate: Agriculture, Commerce, Constitution and Elections, Ecology,
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revision of committee jurisdictions and a limitation on the number of
standing committees. The committee system in Nebraska has also
95
functioned properly despite a legislature of only 49 members.
C.

The Economics of the Legislative Staff

An additional advantage of adoption of a unicameral legislature
would be that, for the same amount of money currently expended on
the bicameral legislature, the staff serving the legislature could be
larger and more comprehensive. The current staff of the legislature
includes 110 employees in the permanent House staff and 80 full-time
employees in the Senate. 96 In addition, extra staff members are hired
during sessions on a pro rata basis. 9 7 Full-time staff members are assigned to a particular committee of each house; part-time staff members are generally assigned to particular legislators, including one sec98
retary per legislator.
Education, Financial Institutions, Higher Education, Judiciary, Labor, Local Government (with subcommittees for Cities, Special Districts, and Counties), Natural Resources, Parks and Recreation, Rules, Social and Health Services, State Government,
Transportation and Utilities (with subcommittees for Highways, Public Transportation
and Planning, and Utilities), and Ways and Means (with subcommittees for Appropriations and Revenues). STATE OF WASHINGTON, LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 326-27 (1975).

In the 49 member Senate, committees are the following sizes: Agriculture, Commerce, and Parks and Recreation have 5 members each; Constitution and Elections
has 6 members; Ecology, Education, Financial Institutions, Higher Education, Labor,
and State Government have 7 members each; Local Government and Natural Resources have 9 members each; Rules and Social and Health Services have 13 members
each; Transportation and Utilities 'has 17 members; and Ways and Means has 19
members. At present six members have four committee assignments, but the remainder
of the senators have only three committee assignments.
It is possible for a legislative body of 49 members to adequately perform the
necessary committee work, particularly where less time is devoted to treatment of
measures from a second house, where there is no time limit on sessions, where members do not have to rush back to their outside jobs after committee meetings, and
where committee jurisdiction is more fully defined.
The 1973 legislature redefined committee jurisdiction and limited the number of
committees upon which a member could serve, but further restructuring is possible.
For example, certain committees such as Education and Higher Education, Ecology
and Natural Resources, and State Government and Elections could be combined.
95.

See D'Alemberte & Fishburne, supra note 5, at 362.

96. Letter from Dean R. Foster, Chief Clerk of the House of Representatives, to
co-author, Sept. 11, 1975, on file with the Washington Law Review.
97.

Id., Oct. 24, 1975.

98. The part-time secretary allotted each legislator is currently the only aide that
most legislators have during legislative sessions. Letter from Dean R. Foster, Chief
Clerk of the House of Representatives, to co-author, Sept. 1I, 1975, on file with the
Washington Law Review.

The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures considers such reliance on part-time
staff for legislators inadequate. It emphasizes that a full-time professional assistant
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Adoption of a unicameral legislature would entail a substantial increase in the staff-per-legislator ratio at no additional cost to the state.
In the proposed unicameral system, the 190 staff members would
serve only 49 legislators instead of the present 147. Part-time staff
members, currently earning up to $95 per day, 9 9 could be replaced by
more competent full-time staff personnel drawing more normal rates
of pay. 100 Staff resources could be used more "efficiently in a unicameral system, since staff time would not be expended on parallel
House and Senate matters. Additionally, each legislator could maintain an office in his home-district to increase the legislator's contact
with his constituency.' 0 '
should be available to every legislator:
Legislative staffs are generally of two main kinds: the institutional, specialized
staff that serves the legislature as a whole-the clerk's office, the fiscal review office,
the auditor's office, the legislative research office--and staff aides for individual
legislators, who are able to do a vaijety of tasks: conduct research, write reports,
deal with executive agencies, help constituents. Most legislatures do not have
enough of either kind of staff, and both" are equally important to the ability of
the legislature and of legislators to function.
Every state legislator, especially one who occupies a position of leadership,
should have at least one full-time professionalassistant.
CITZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 40, at 62-64 (emphasis
added).
Because of the increased staff-per-legislator ratio under the proposed unicameral
legislature, full-time professional assistants could be introduced into the Washington
legislature.
99. In the 1975 session, an attorney for the Senate Democratic caucus earned
$95 per day. Average pay was from $32 to $35 per day. Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
March 12, 1975, § A, at 9, col. 4.
100. Former Speaker of the House Leonard A. Sawyer made the following comments in 1974 following the establishment of professional research staffs in the legislature:
The staffs of previous legislatures generally were appointed on a patronage basis.
Typically, staff members obtained employment because they had performed campaign work or political favors for committee chairmen or other influential
legislators. As a result, legislative standing committees were staffed all too often
by part-time employees with neither legislative research skills nor familiarity with
the subject matters within their committees' jurisdictions. Needless to say, this
kind of nonprofessional patronage staff was not capable of providing the Legislature with the research and information which it requires in order to intelligently
consider legislation.
Mardesich & Sawyer, Introduction to Symposium: Recent Washingtqn Legislation,
49 WASH. L. REv. 287,289 (1974). 1
Sawyer's remarks are equally applicable to the part-time staff currently hired by
the legislature. The danger of an ineffective and less than competent "patronage staff"
is particularly high, since part-time employees hired for sessions are hired by minority
and majority caucuses. Letter from Dean P. Foster, Chief Clerk of the House of
Representatives, to co-author, Oct. 24, 1975.
101. One of the major recommendations of the Citizens Conference on State
Legislatures pertains to district offices:
District offices are vital to the effective representation by a legislator of his
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Legislative Accountability

The unicameral legislature, unlike its bicameral counterpart, would
be structured to facilitate more direct legislative responsibility to the
voters.' 0 2 This would result for a number of reasons. First, because of
the unicameral legislature's "single focus," it would be more easily
understood by the voters:1 0 3 "Its processes are simple. The passage of
a measure takes the course of introduction, reference to a standing
committee, deliberation in committee of the whole, vote on passage
and signature by the governor. Each step in procedure is clear cut and
final." Moreover, the Nebraska experience suggests that media coverage of the legislature should also be enhanced by this "single focus"
1 04
effect of a unicameral legislature.
Adoption of a unicameral legislature could also expedite public
exposure of the role of lobbyists in the legislative process. The knowledgeable lobbyist can quietly manipulate the present system and avoid
exposure because of the complexity of the bicameral legislative pro1
cess. As one commentator observed:

05

Even if the lobbyist does not succeed in controlling the house of
constituency. The legislature should make some contribution to the support of
district offices for its members, and the amount of this contribution should be
increased over time.
CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 40, at 160-61.
At present, members of the Washington State Legislature are accorded $50 per
month for home district expenses- Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, Research
Memorandum 18, How Much Are State Legislators Paid? Table 3, at 8, Sept. 1975
(copy on file with the Washington Law Review). This is not, however, sufficient to
defray the cost of maintaining an office and a minimal staff in the district. Under the
authors' proposed unicameral system, the cost of maintaining such home districts
could be defrayed by the overall savings in salary associated with a smaller unicameral
legislature. See note 72 supra.
102. By way of comparison, Nebraska was recently ranked first in accountability
among the 50 state legislatures, while Washington ranked 17th. Citizens Conference
on State Legislatures, supra note 40, at 251, 322. See also note 40 supra.
103. J. SENNING, supra note 86, at 79.
104. One newspaper reporter described the Nebraska unicameral legislature as
follows:
The unicameral legislature is the newspaper man's paradise. As a legislative reporter his mission is to keep the public informed as to the nature, purpose. and
progress of legislation. The unicameral simplifies this task. Everything is open and
above board. There are no secret meetings from which he is barred, and every
facility is afforded for keeping track of the work of the lawmakers. Having
observed the old way and the new, I unequivocally say that the new way is unmeasurably the better.
D'Alemberte & Fishburne, supra note 5, at 361. The Nebraska press had originally
opposed the unicameral concept, but its dealing with the unicameral body altered
that view. See also H. SUMMERS, supra note 74, at 141-45.
105.
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origin, he has the second house upon which to work. If the second
house cannot be persuaded to accept his plans, he may have the bill
amended and at the same time urge the first house not to concur in the
amendments, thereby forcing the bill into the conference committee. If
the lobbyist can dictate the vote of the majority of the members of either house in the conference committee his measure is reported to the
two houses in the form he wishes. . . . In the intricacies of legislative
procedure in a bicameral legislature, a clever lobbyist has many opportunities to promote or defeat legislation. . . . The unscrupulous
lobby is . . . dependent for success on the complexities of the legislative procedure under the bicameral system.

Thus, the simplification of the legislative process under a unicameral
system should reduce the opportunity for manipulation and subject
lobbyists to greater public scrutiny.
Perhaps most importantly, unicameralism in Washington would
eliminate the current shifting of responsibilities among legislators.
Under the current bicameral legislature, members of one house frequently shift responsibility for inadequate legislation or the failure to
enact needed legislation to members of the other. 106 Legislators
thereby evade responsibility for positions they in fact assumed. Similarly, legislators take positions on bills with the knowledge that the
other chamber will not act on the bill, or will amend or defeat it.107
Such actions shift responsibility for legislation, or the lack of it, from
legislative body to legislative body, impede the accountability of the
legislators to their constituency, and prevent public knowledge of legislators' positions on particular pieces of legislation. These drawbacks
could be eliminated by adoption of a unicameral legislature. 08
106. See id. at 79-80, 88.
107. This appears to be a common occurrence, as the following story from New
York reveals:
The second house is sometimes used as an excuse for. the failure of a popular, but
in the eyes of the legislators, bad measure. The story is told of the time the
Speaker of the Assembly phoned the Senate majority, leader about the flood of
bad bills the Senate was approving that year, confident that the Assembly would
knock them down. He told the majority leader that if the Senate passed and
continued to send over that kind of legislation-he used a shorter and more
descriptive term--he would have the Assembly pass it too, and how would the
Senate like that? The flood of bad bills slowed down. Obviously, this is not
the sort of use which proponents of the bicameral system intend to be made
of the second chamber when they speak of independent review. In its worst form,
it permits the shirking of legislative responsibility by providing a sort of ritual
to keep constituents or interests satisfied.
Comment, A Unicameral Legislature in New York: A Review and a Proposal,supra
note 89, at 318.
108. An added benefit of creation of a unicameral legislature would be elimina-
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POTENTIAL MEANS OF ADOPTING A UNICAMERAL
LEGISLATURE IN WASHINGTON

Regardless of the attractiveness of a unicameral legislature, some
viable means of implementing the change from bicameralism to unicameralism must be discovered. Because constitutional reform is necessary
to create a unicameral legislature, there are presently three theoretical
means of implementing this change: 1) initiative; 2) constitutional
amendment by the legislature; and 3) constitutional amendment by
constitutional convention. Unfortunately none of the three offers an
expeditious means of amending the state constitution to provide for
a unicameral legislature.
A.

Initiative

According to the Washington constitution,1 09 the initiative process
reserves to the people the power to submit bills for enactment. Such
initiatives may be addressed either to the people themselves, or to the
legislature. Briefly stated, the process consists of the following steps:
tion of the current conference committee. As described by one commentator:
[A conference committee] is composed of representatives from the two chambers
who meet and seek to eliminate the differences between bills that have passed
the houses with different content. Each house selects its conferees; usually this
selection will be made by the leadership. Each set of conferees represents its
house and may refuse to agree with the conferees from the other house. The
range of discretion in the hands of the conferees fluctuates, but the critics of
the device assert that the conference committee becomes in fact a third chamber
of the legislature and an irresponsible one. The proceedings are secret unless revealed by a member, and if an agreement is reached, the two houses are usually
faced with the choices of acceptance of the compromise or no legislation. In
proportion to the number of important bills going to conference and being
settled there, the bicameral legislature becomes substantially different from the
legislative assembly that its proponents admire.
Hogan. The Bicameral Principle in State Legislatures, II J. PUB. L. 310, 321 (1962).
Senator George Norris, one of the strongest proponents of unicameralism in Nebraska, believed that the elimination of conference committees was a major virtue
of the unicameral mode:
It is more powerful in all matters referred to it than either house, or than both
houses combined. Moreover, it transacts its business in an un-American and undemocratic manner. Its meeting are held in secret; there is no such thing as a
roll-call vote, and there is no record of its proceedings. A bill once referred to a
conference committee cannot become law unless it is agreed to by a majority of
the conferees representing each house. Thus, it is within the power of the conference committee, in secret and without a record vote, and without any public
record whatever, to absolutely prevent legislation, and to kill or to modify, at
its pleasure, any proposed legislation within its jurisdiction.
J. SENNING, supra note 86, at 34, quoting The Progressive, Dec. 29, 1934.
.109. WASH. CONST. amends. 7. 26, 30, 36. See generally INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 92-102.
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proposal of an initiative measure, acceptance of the measure by the
Secretary of State and preparation of a ballot title by the Attorney
General, circulation and signing of initiative petitions, and, in the case
of an initiative to the people, approval by a majority of the electorate. 110 If the initiative is addressed to the legislature, the legislature
may enact it into law, refuse to act on or reject it (in which case the
measure is resubmitted to the people for approval), or propose an alternative measure to the people."' Additionally, any initiative which
becomes law may be repealed or amended by the legislature within
a12
two years of its enactment.
Despite the seeming attractiveness of the initiative process to adopt
a unicameral legislature in Washington, its utilization appears unlikely
because of limitations applied by the Attorney General and the state
supreme court. In 1970 an initiative was introduced which proposed
an amendment to the constitution. The Attorney General, however,
refused to prepare a ballot title for the measure, effectively foreclosing
any possibility of the initiative appearing on the ballot without a court
battle. The Attorney General reasoned that, although amendment 7 to
the Washington constitution reserved to the people the right to propose laws through the initiative process, amendment 37 granted to the
legislature the exclusive power to propose constitutional amendments."13 Because this power of constitutional amendment had been
granted to another body rather than reserved to the people, the Attorney General refused to allow the people, through the initiative pro110.

INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 92-102.

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. After reviewing the Attorney General's historical position toward state constitutional amendment by initiative, he concluded:
[I] t is still our opinion that the people of our state have not been given the
power, under Article II, § I (Amendment 7) to propose amendments to the state
constitution through the initiative process. . . . [I] t follows that the proposal
contained in the document you have denominated as "Initiative Measure No. 249"
-which on its face proposes an amendment to the constitution and not merely
an ordinary law-cannot be regarded as an initiative under the constitution and'
implementing statutes . . . pertaining to preparation of ballot title by this office.
Accordingly, no duty is imposed upon this office by that statute to prepare a
ballot title for the proposal in question ....
Letter from Slade Gorton, Washington State Attorney General, to A. Ludlow Kramer, Washington State Secretary of State, Feb. 20, 1970, at 9-10, copy on file with
the Washington Law Review. More recently, the Attorney General has used the same
reasoning to deny ballot access. See Letter from Phillip Austin, Washington State
Deputy Attorney General, to Bruce Chapman, Secretary of State for the State of
Washington, April 6, 1976, copy on file with the Washington Law Review.
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cess, to exercise it. The Washington Supreme Court subsequently
t 14
adopted this view in Ford v. Logan.
An initiative proposing the adoption of a unicameral legislature
would entail amendment of the constitution. The Attorney General
opinions and Logan appear, therefore, to foreclose utilization of the
initiative process to adopt unicameralism.
B.

ConstitutionalAmendment by the Legislature

The Washington constitution provides for legislatively proposed
amendments to the constitution, provided they are approved by twothirds of the legislature, and a majority of the populace.115 A legislatively-proposed constitutional amendment is therefore another theoretical means of creating a unicameral legislature. It appears unlikely,
however, that a unicameral legislature will be created by the legislature itself. A poll of legislators by the authors, to which 100 replied,
reveals that only 19 percent of all representatives responding and 22
percent of all senators responding favor the creation of a unicameral
legislature." 6 Other institutional changes, such as joint committees,
the abolition of the office of lieutenant governor, or a full-time legisla7
ture, are also opposed by the legislators."
This opposition to enactment of a constitutional amendment creating a unicameral legislature may be attributed primarily to two factors." 8 The first is a genuine philosophical opposition to any altera114. 79 Wn. 2d 147, 483 P.2d 1247 (1971). In Logan a plurality opinion involving the right of King County citizens to repeal the King County "home rule"
charter by initiative, the supreme court held that the initiative process is limited to
subject matter which is legislative in nature and cannot be used to amend the organic law of a governmental unit. In dictum, the court stated:
Amendment of our constitution is not a legislative act and thus is not within the
initiative power reserved to the voters. It necessarily follows that that which cannot be amended by legislation cannot be abolished thereby. By its nature, then,
the initiative power set forth in Const. art. 2 does not include the power to
directly amend or repeal the constitution itself.
Id. at 156, 483 P.2d 1252.
115. WASH. CONST.amend. 37.
116. See Appendix A infra.
117. Id.
118. In an unpublished memorandum, another authority came to the same conclusion in analyzing the bases for opposition to unicameralism in the present legislature: "The reasons are numerous, but can be abbreviated into two major categories: (1) political motivation and desire to maintain the status quo. and; (2)
sincere philosophical reluctance to take such drastic reorganizational steps." J. Daniels. The Unicameral Legislature 36 (undated research report available from State of
Washington Senate Research Center).
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tion of the two-house legislature that traditionally has served the
American nation and states. The following remark by one state legislator indicates this sentiment: 119 "The bicameral legislature is very
valuable because it allows a second look at legislation. My experience
shows me it is easier for me to obtain approval of a bill in the House
than in the Senate and I am sure Senators have an easier time in the
Senate. I think it is healthy." The poll results suggest that this sentiment may be pervasive.
A second reason for the present legislators' reluctance to endorse
the concept of a smaller unicameral legislature is self-interest and
party affiliation. Because the present legislature contains 147 members, while the prbposed unicameral legislature would contain only
one-third that number, enactment of any constitutional amendient
creating a unicameral body would eliminate two-thirds of the legislative positions available. Ninety-eight elected officials would be legislating themselves out of a position by voting in favor of a unicameral
body. Past legislative treatment of similar issues suggests a reluctance
to act when self-interest is involved.
The two instances since 1962 in which the legislature attempted to
carry out its constitutionally-mandated duty to reapportion its own
districts perhaps represent the closest illustration of the effect of selfinterest on plans to structurally change the legislature. The first confrontation with reapportionment began in 1962. In Thigpen v.
Meyers 20 the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Washington held that the existing legislative apportionment was illegal
and void, but continued the case until the 1963 legislature had an
opportunity to redistrict itself. After 83 days, however, the legislature
was unable to enact a redistricting statute, largely because "[e] ach
incumbent demanded to know precisely what part of his district would
be altered before he would give his support to any measure."' 12 1 Party
politics also entered into the legislature's consideration. 122 In response
to this failure to act the district court declared the existent apportion-

119. Response of state legislator to authors' poll, Appendix A infra.
120. 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962), affd per curiain, 378 U.S. 554 (1964). See generally INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 13-14;
McDermott, Judicial Sanctions and Legislative Redistricting in Washington State, 45
WASH. L. REV. 681 (1970).
121. McDermott, supra note 120, at 693.

122.

Id. at 694.
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ment scheme unconstitutional and null and void. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed 1 23 on the basis of Reynolds.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Thigpen, the district
court granted the legislature an opportunity to reapportion legislative
districts, and the court directed the legislature to enact a redistricting
plan before passing upon any other legislation. 124 Forty-seven days
passed before the two houses of the legislature could enact an apportionment statute in compliance with Reynolds.t 2 5 Although the resultant statute was acceptable to the district court, it had required 130
days of consideration by the legislature and its partisan nature was
obvious.126
A similar situation faced the legislature in 1972. Following the legislature's failure to redistrict in the 1971 regular session on the basis
of the 1970 federal census, suit was again brought in federal district
court 12 7 to reapportion in accord with the principles of Reynolds. As
it had ten years previously, the district court again allowed the legislature an opportunity to reapportion its districts. When the legislature
adjourned from its 1972 extraordinary session without having enacted
a new apportionment statute, the district court appointed a special
master who drew up the legislative districts which serve the state
28
today.1
A similar reticence to modify legislative structure when the self-interest of many members is involved may account in part for the
123. 378 U.S. 554 (1964), affg per curian 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962).
124. See McDermott, supra note 120, at 70 1-19.
125. Id. The court retained jurisdiction over the case in order to review any
redistricting statute that might be passed by the legislature. 211 F. Supp. 826. 832
(W.D. Wash. 1962).
126. A knowledgeable observer described the impact as follows:
In the Senate, five incumbents would be eliminated in the 1966 election. Two
were Republicans, two were Democrats, and one seat would be fought over by
incumbents from opposing parties. . . . [T] he possibility of maintaining
Democratic control appeared favorable. In the House. [the statute] appeared to
benefit the Republicans and those Democrats who supported their cause. Sixteen members . . . were threatened by the bill by being forced to compete with
other incumbents in 1966. Of these sixteen, only three were Republicans and
only one was a dissident Democrat . . . . It was certain that four Democrats

would be eliminated. The two Republicans sacrificed in the redistricting bill were
given appointments in the Evans' administration. The immediate advantage of
the redistricting bill thus went to the Republicans.
McDermott, supra note 120. at 717-18 (footnotes omitted).
127. Prince v. Kramer, Civil No. 9668 (W.D. Wash. April 21. 1972). affd sub
noma., AFL-CIO v. Prince, 409 U.S. 808 (1972). See generally INSTITUTE OF GovERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 14-15.
128. See generally Morrill, On Criteriafor Redistricting, 48 WASH. L. REV. 847
(1973) (authored by the special master appointed by the Princecourt).
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opposition to unicameralism demonstrated in the authors' poll. This
opposition, based either on philosophical belief or self-interest, is
sufficiently widespread to make a constitutional amendment creating a
unicameral legislature an unlikely event.
C.

ConstitutionalAmendment by ConstitutionalConvention

The Washington constitution provides that, upon a two-thirds vote
of both houses of the legislature, a recommendation must be made to
the electorate to convene a constitutional convention. Upon approval
by a majority of the electorate the legislature must, at the next session,
provide for the calling of a convention and the means of election of
delegates thereto. Any revision or amendment adopted by the conven129
tion must then be approved by a majority of the electorate.
Several factors confuse analysis of the feasibility of enacting a unicameral legislature by means of a constitutional convention. First, although certain legislators have attempted to enact measures creating a
constitutional convention, other members have successfully opposed
such legislation. 130 A 1968 State Constitutional Revision Conference
attributed this legislative attitude to "vested interests, public suspicion
and fear and a general distrust of change.' 13 ' Regardless of its source,
this legislative reluctance substantially diminishes the possibility of a
constitutional convention being proposed by the legislature.
A countervailing factor which may increase the possibility of a constitutional convention is the support of Governor Evans for constitutional reform. In 1968, for example, Evans appointed a 20-member
Constitutional Revision Commission which proposed a model state
constitution. 132 Perhaps because it provided the governor more power
and legislators less secrecy than the existent constitution, however, the
129.

WASH. CONiST. art. XXIII, § 2.

130. Commenting in 1970, one authority stated: "Bills to convene a constitutional convention have been introduced in nearly every session for the past thirty
years but the legislature has voted on the issue once. . . .That bill was allowed to
die in the Senate." Comment, Convening a Constitutional Convention in Washington
Through the Use of the Popular Initiative, 45 WASH. L. REV. 535, 536 (1970). No
bill proposing a constitutional convention has been passed in the interim between
1970 and the present. Attempts to obtain a constitutional convention in 1975-76
also failed. SJ.R. 115, 44th [Wash. State] Legis., Reg. Sess. (1975-76); HJ.R. Res.
21, 44th [Wash. State] Legis., Reg. Sess. (1975-76).
131. SeattleTimes, June 14, 1968, § A, at 3, col. 1.
132. See Seattle Times, Oct. 17, 1969, at 10, col. 1; id. Oct. 29, 1968, at 28-29,
col. 1.
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legislature failed to take any action on the proposal. 133 More recently,
the governor has created a Commission for Constitutional Alternatives. 13 4 Unlike the earlier Commission, which proposed a revised
state constitution, the 1975 Commission is designed to gauge public
interest in a constitutional convention, educate the public on the constitutional convention process, and propose to the legislature a bill
which would propose to the people a constitutional convention.' 3 5
Some observers, however, view the likelihood of success for the con1 36
vention pessimistically.
A final factor to be considered in determining the feasibility of a
Washington constitutional convention is use of the initiative to call a
constitutional convention. Such an initiative was originally proposed
in 1968.137 The Secretary of State, however, refused to accept the initiative, finding the legislature the exclusive body to call a constitutional convention. The initiative's proponents sought a writ of mandamus. In State ex rel. O'Connell v. Kramer,13 8 the supreme court
refused to pass upon the constitutionality of the initiative until the
requisite number of signatures had been procured, ruling instead that
the Secretary of State must perform the basically ministerial task of
processing the initiative. Perhaps because of this court battle, the initiative's proponents were unable to obtain the requisite number of sig39
natures, and the initiative was not presented to the people.
Although the constitutionality of calling a constitutional convention
by initiative remains unsettled, a proposal for such a convention has
been advanced. 140 If this right is found to exist, calling a convention
by means of the initiative process would seem to offer the greatest
potential for proposing a unicameral legislature as an amendment to
the Washington constitution.
133. See Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 24, 1968, at 29, col. 1.
134. Exec. Order No. 75-08 (1975) (on file with the Office of Governor for the
State of Washington). See also Seattle Post-Intelligencer. July 30. 1975. § A, at 7.
col. 1.
135. See Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 30, 1975. § A, at 7, col. I.
136. After creation of the Constitutional Alternatives Commission one observer
commented:
The effort to re-write Washington's 86-year-old Constitution got off to a
reasonably good start last week. But when one lines up all the arguments for
it-and there are some good ones-against the various interests that naturally
will oppose it, the problem is awesome.
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 19, 1975, § A, at 10, col. 3.
137. See Seattle Times, July 6, 1968, at A, col. 2.
138. 73 Wn. 2d 85, 436 P.2d 786(1968).
139. See Seattle Times, July 6, 1968, at A, col. 2.
140. See generally Comment, supra note 130.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Three general conclusions may be drawn from the analysis of unicameralism offered by this comment. First, unicameralism offers a
tenable means of altering the legislative structure to adequately reflect
recent socio-economic and political changes which have increased the
activity and importance of the Washington legislature. In turn this
structural alteration offers the prospect of electing legislators who can
afford to be more independent of ties to special interest groups. Although a unicameral legislature cannot and should not be considered
the solution for all the ills of the current legislature, its implementation could increase the efficiency and responsibility of the Washington
legislative system.
Second, the current legislature cannot be relied upon to implement
any structural change in the legislative system. The legislature's reluctance to act upon constitutional amendments, constitutional conventions, and especially its own reapportionment, amply demonstrate the
affect of self-interest when any structural change in the legislature is
suggested. This self-interest, taken with traditional philosophical opposition to altering the bicameral legislative system affectively precludes resort to the legislature to bring about unicameralism in Washington.
A third factor to be considered in analyzing the possibility of unicameralism in Washington is the general public's traditional acceptance
of bicameral legislative systems at the state level. It is somewhat
anomalous that the American people accept a unicameral legislative
body to govern such cities as New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles and
yet appear reluctant to accept unicameral bodies to govern states of
smaller size and less diversity. 141 Until this traditional attitude is overcome, the possibility that unicameralism will become a reality in a
state other than Nebraska is slim. If and when these attitudinal obsta141.

New York City has a population of 7,647,000 and an annual budget of

$11.536 billion; Chicago a population of 3,173,000 and an annual budget of $1.031
billion; Los Angeles a population of 2,747,000 and a budget of $1.244 billion.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 23-25, 271 (1975) (all figures for 1973). Compare those figures with the

following states: Montana (population 694,000, annual budget $640 miulion), id. at
14, 262, North Dakota (population 618,000, annual budget $515 million). Id. It
should also be noted that Washington's population and budget figures (population
3,409,000, annual budget $3,612 billion) id. are not substantially greater than Chicago's or Los Angeles', and substantially less than New York's.

937

Washington Law Review

Vol. 51: 901, 1976

cles are overcome, unicameralism will indeed be a worthwhile alternative to the current bicameral legislatures in America.
Randall A. Peterman*
Philip Talmadge**

*
**

B.A., 1973, Northwest Nazarene College; J.D., 1976, University of Washington.
B.A., 1973, Yale University; J.D., 1976. University of Washington.
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APPENDIX A
In October of 1975 questionnaires containing the nucleus of the
reform measure set forth in Appendix B were sent to the members of
both houses of the Washington legislature. The questionnaire asked
members to identify their party affiliation and the chamber in which
they serve. Answers to five questions pertaining to the unicameral legis142 Most
lature and, comments from the legislators also were solicited.
notably, the members of the present legislature overwhelmingly expressed opposition to institutional change in the legislature. A unicameral legislature, joint committees, the abolition of the office of lieutenant governor, and the concept of a full-time legislature clearly were
opposed by members. Sentiment on the continuing session concept was
divided more evenly.
The following were the results of the poll conducted by the authors:
POLITICAL PARTY-NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Total
Membership Responses Percentage

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Democrats
Republicans
SENATE
Democrats
Republicans

98
62
36
49
30
19

63
36
27
37
21
16

64.3%
58.1%
75.0%
75.5%
70.0%
84.2%

QUESTION: If confronted with a constitutional amendment that
would provide for a one-house legislature of 49 members elected for
4-year terms, whose members would meet annually and devote fulltime attention to legislative business in exchange for compensation
that would be no less than 60% of the Governor's official salary, I
would
Favor
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Democrats
Republicans
SENATE
Democrats
Republicans

12(19.0%)
7 (19.4%)
5 (18.5%)
8(21.6%)
6 (28.6%)
2(12.5%)

Oppose

No Answer

48(76.2%)
27 (75.0%)
21(77.7%)
29(78.4%)
15 (71.4%)
14(87.5%)

3(4.8%)
2 (5.6%)
1(3.8%)

142. The authors also marked the response envelopes with numbers so that the
district which the responding member represented would be disclosed. This was

939

Vol. 51: 901, 1976

Washington Law Review

QUESTION: If confronted with a bill to make all committees of the
legislature joint committees of the two Houses, I would
Favor
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Democrats
Republicans
SENATE
Democrats
Republicans

Oppose

No Answer
5(7.9%)
2(5.6%)
3(11.2%)
1 (2.7%)
1(4.8%)

25(39.7%) 33 (52.4%)
13 (36.1%) 21(58.3%)
12(44.4%) 12 (44.4%)
8(21.6%) 28 (75.7%)
4(19.0%) 16(76.2%)
4(25.0%) 12(75.0%)

QUESTION: I would-the abolition of the Office of Lieutenant
Governor.
Favor
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Democrats
Republicans
SENATE
Democrats
Republicans

QUESTION: I

11(17.5%)
6(16.7%)
5(18.5%)
2( 5.4%)
0
2(12.5%)

Oppose

No Answer
1(1.6%)
1(2.7%)

51(80.9%)
29(80.6%)
22(81.5%)
35(94.6%)
21(100.0%)
14(87.5%)

the concept of the continuing session legislature.

designed to ensure that the response accurately reflected feelings of legislators from
all parts of the state. Anonymity of responding legislators was strictly preserved.
The following legislative districts were designated as urban districts because of
their territorial expanse and the presence of major urban centers within their boundaries: 1.3.5. 11, 14, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31. 32. 33, 34. 35, 36. 37. 38. 41, 43. 44, 46.
48. 49. This distinction is admittedly somewhat arbitrary given the presence of major
cities within some of the districts classified rural and the presence of rural areas
within the urban districts. The following table illustrates the responses received, broken
down by geographical area and population:
URBAN/RURAL-EASTERNWESTERN WASHINGTON

Urban district
Rural district
Unknown
Eastern Washington
Western Washington
Unknown

Total

Responses

Percentage

72
75

43
54
3
28
69
3

59.7
72.0

39
108

71.8
63.9

It should be noted that subsequent to the polling of the members of the legislature.
the authors altered their proposal for legislative compensation from 60% to 50% of
the governor's salary.

940

A Proposal for Unicameralism
Favor

Oppose

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 30 (47.6%) 30(47.6%)
6(16.7%)
27(75.0%)
Democrats
3 (10.0%) 27 (90.0%)
Republicans
11 (29.7%) 23(62.2%)
SENATE
8(38.1%) 12(57.1%)
Democrats
3 (18.8%) 11(68.7%)
Republicans

QUESTION: L

No Answer
3(4.8%)
3(8.3%)
3(8.1%)
1 (4.8%)
2(12.5%)

_the concept of a full-time professional legislature.
Favor

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 23 (36.5%)'
18 (50.0%)
Democrats
5 (18.5%)
Republicans
10(27.0%)
SENATE
8 (38.1%)
Democrats
2(12.5%)
Republicans

Oppose
37(58.7%)
16 (44.4%)
21(77.7%)
27(73.0%)
13 (61.9%)
14(87.5%)

No Answer
3(4.8%)
2 (5.6%)
1(3.8%)
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APPENDIX B
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

43

§ 1. SECTIONS AFFECTED. The following sections of the Washington Constitution (1889) and the following amendments are hereby
specifically repealed:
Article II;
Article III, Sections 10, 16;
Article V, Section 1;
Amendments 6, 7, 13, 26, 30, 32, 35, 36, 52, 56.
Unless specifically repealed, amendments will remain in effect.
Commentary: Section 1 repeals earlier constitutional provisions.
§2. LEGISLATIVE POWER. The legislative power of the State of

Washington shall be vested in the legislature, consisting of a single
house, but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose bills,

laws, and constitutional amendments, and to enact or reject the same
at the polls independent of the legislature. The people also reserve the

power to approve or reject any act, item, section, or part of any bill,
act or law, passed by the legislature, at the polls.

Commentary: Section 2 establishes a unicameral legislature, describes
the legislative power in broad terms, and serves to alter in a significant
fashion the initiative power of the people. Given the difficulties confronted by reformers in gaining constitutional reform through the
legislature, it seems reasonable that the initiative process should be
available to bring about constitutional amendments.
143. The sample unicameral constitutional amendment proposed by the authors
is a comprehensive revision of the legislative article of the Washington Constitution.
Other unicameral constitution models have been proposed. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 43 (6th ed. 1963); Constitutional Revision in

Washington; Legal Aspects 62-68, 1970 (student papers edited by R. Johnson on file
in the University of Washington Law School library); J. Daniels. The Unicameral
Legislature 35-43 (undated research report available from State of Washington Senate Research Center).
This constitutional revision includes reforms not discussed in the text. and many
of the changes advanced are ones that may be appropriate for unicameral or bicameral legislatures. The purpose of this section is to propose a comprehensive alternative to stimulate discussion of legislative structural change. It should be emphasized.
however, that the efficacy of unicameralism in general does not depend on many of
the particular alterations suggested herein. Where existing constitutional language
was exhaustive, the authors sought to abbreviate the language for the sake of clarity.
See Appendix B, Commentary to Section 3 infra.
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§3. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM. The legislature is authorized to determine the mode, manner, and procedures for enacting
constitutional amendments by initiative, and for enacting legislation
by initiative or referendum, and shall determine the procedures for
the elections subject to the following requirements:
(a) a referendum may be ordered on any act, bill, or law passed
by the legislature only by petition of the requisite number of legal
voters of the state;
(b) any measure initiated by the people or referred to the people
shall take effect and become the law or a part of the constitution if
it is approved by a majority of the voters;
(c) the veto power of the governor shall not extend to measures
enacted by initiative or referendum;
(d) no act, law, or bill, subject to referendum or initiated by the
people and approved by a majority of the electors. voting thereon,
shall be amended by the legislature within three years following such
enactment. Such enactment may be amended by the people at any
time, or by the legislature three years after enactment by a vote of
two-thirds of the legislature;.
(e)the legislature shall provide methods of publicity for all laws
and amendments to the constitution referred to the people or initiated by the people, with arguments for and against the laws and
amendments. Each voter shall be apprised of such information and
shall be given adequate opportunity to study such measures prior
to the election.
Commentary: Section 3 simplifies the existing procedures for initiative and referendum and affirmatively requires the legislature to enact
legislation dealing with these processes, subject to the qualifications
enumerated. It is assumed that constitutional language should be as
fundamental as possible, and that the legislature is the proper body
to establish detailed requirements for the exercise of the initiative
and referendum powers.
§ 4. LEGISLATION.
(A) A bill shall become law upon (1) final passage by a majority
of the members of the legislature present; (2) being signed by the
presiding officer of the legislature; and (3) the passage of 30 days since
its enactment.
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(B) The legislature shall keep a journal of its proceedings and
the yeas and nays of members shall be recorded and reported on all
bills in committee and before the full legislature. Committee reports
must be printed in the journal.
(C) No laws shall be enacted by the legislature except by bill. The
subject of a bill shall be expressed in its title. The style of the laws of
the state shall be: "Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Washington."
(D) The legislature shall enact procedures for the introduction,
revision, and amendment of bills.
Commentary: Section 4 establishes generally the means by which a
bill becomes law. It also requires that the votes of members in committee must be published in the legislative journal. Publication of votes
in committee tends to emphasize the responsibility of the legislator to
take consistent and open positions regarding legislation, and enhances
the ability of constituents and the press to discover the views of the
legislator.
The present "one-subject" requirement is deleted from the proposed constitutional revision because it is confusing and leads to un44
necessary litigation on valuable legislation.'
§ 5. SPECIAL LEGISLATION. The legislature may not enact private or special legislation.
Commentary: A detailed list of subjects constituting special legislation has been deleted. The courts can better determine what is private legislation that unduly complicates the legislative process.
§ 6. SUITS AGAINST THE STATE. The legislature shall enact procedures governing the bringing of suits against the state.
144. The one-subject requirement, which compels the legislature to restrict legislation to a single "subject," is presently imposed by WASH. CONST., art. II, § 19.
Litigation on this issue is quite frequent, but the Washington court has sought to
forestall the harsher effects of the constitutional provision. In Washington State
School Directors Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Indus. the supreme court stated:
The purposes of this constitutional provision are: to protect and enlighten the
members of the legislature; to apprise the people generally concerning the subjects of the legislation being considered, and to prevent hodge-podge or logrolling legislation. . . . Const. art. 2, § 19 is to be liberally construed so as not
to impose awkward and hampering restrictions upon the legislature.
82 Wn. 2d 367, 371, 510 P.2d 818, 821 (1973).
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Commentary: Section 6 follows the present constitutional provision.
§ 7. SESSIONS. The legislature shall meet in open session except
where the public welfare shall require secrecy. Sessions of the legislature shall be annual and shall be of a duration determined by that
body. The legislature may be called into session by the governor, or by
a proportion of the membership of the legislature as the legislature
shall determine.
Commentary: Section 7 specifies that annual sessions shall be required
and that the legislature may call itself into session. These are reforms
basic to a functional modem legislature, and serve to emphasize the
14 5
full-time nature of legislative service.
§ 8. MEMBERSIUP AND APPORTIONMENT. The legislature
shall consist of no fewer than 45 and no more than 60 members
elected for terms of four years, half of the members being elected every
two years. Members of the legislhture shall be called Senators. Senators shall be elected by single districts of convenient and contiguous
territory and equivalent populations. To that end, the legislature shall
apportion according to the enumeration of the population made every
ten years under the authority of the federal government. The legislature is authorized to enact legislation providing for an expert nonpartisan body to assist in the task of reapportionment and redistricting.
Commentary: Section 8, in describing the membership of the unicameral body and the redistricting procedure, is a difficult and important
section. The membership of the legislature is limited to between 45
and 60 members, because, it appears that a smaller body can be more
efficient, better salaried, and better staffed than the present bicameral
legislature for approximately the same cost. Transition to the unicam145. As one authority states:
A legislature that meets only in biennial sessions faces formidable problems,
most notably in fiscal planning. It is extremely difficult, even under the best of
circumstances, to forecast revenues and expenditures six months or a year ahead;
it is impossible to do so with any degree of accuracy two or three years ahead.
Yet that is what legislatures on a strictly biennial schedule are required to do ....
Moreover, to the degree that a legislature iNin any respedt restricted-in length
and frequency of session, it cannot perform some of its basic tasks: it 6annot,
for example, monitor the activities of an executive branch that operates on a
year-round basis, or engage in long-range planning or study.
CITIZEN'S CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 40, at 58-59.
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eral body could be facilitated by utilization of a 49-member legislature
46
with retention of the present Senatorial districts.1
Multimember districts have been rejected for a number of reasons.
Multimember districts frequently preclude direct accountability and
147
may be so large as to prevent effective legislator-constituent contact.
146. A frequent concern of the legislators polled was the representativeness of a
smaller legislative body as shown by the following responses:
"When you say 'full-time professional legislature.' I would be opposed to a
smaller membership in both Houses. Now people know who their legislators arewe here in the country would lose our representation to Tacoma."
"Why so small a body? I hope not in the belief it would be cheaper. The Legislature's costs are only 3/10 of 1% of the budget."
"Unicameral is ok, but keep it large enough to have sufficient working manpower for the 15 or so committees that are essential, and large enough to make
it difficult to build a power block (sic) that controls. Remember, the legislature
is controlled by a majority of the majority party-in a body of 49 it takes only
13. If you believe in representative government, stay with a larger group and
keep it part-time."
"Reducing the size of the legislature is a panacea proposed by those who are
somehow trying to compensate the state treasury with fewer people at higher
cost. This is absurd, because the converse is not true that a large legislature at a
smaller cost is of poorer quality. There is no logic to either assumption; that
small is better quality than large. I think a district benefits from multi-member
districts. There is a diversity of view that results in greater representation that is
highly desirable. A smaller legislature can be controlled by the majority at one
caucus [and] this is bad. It can be controlled now, but it is difficult and in any
case is impossible to keep hidden from the people. The smaller the elite, the
easier it is to keep things from the public."
Response of various legislators to authors' poll (on file with the Washington Law
Review). The size of a legislature and its representativeness are not necessarily closely
related, as the following figures from randomly selected states indicate:
No. of
No. of
Representativeness
State
Senators
Reps.
Rating
New York
57
150
1
California
40
80
2
New Mexico
42
70
4
Nebraska
49
18
Massachusetts
40
240
23
Pennsylvania
50
203
36
Georgia
56
195
38
Washington
49
98
39
New Hampshire
24
400
43
Vermont
30
150
47
Figures compiled from CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 40.
at 52-53 & League of Women Voters of Seattle, Seattle Supplement to "'Continuing
Study of the Washington State Legislature." March 1-7. 1973 (on file with the Washington Law Review). For a description of the term "representativeness" see CITIZENS
CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 40. at 52-53, 134-4 1.
147.

CITIZENS CONFERENCE

ON STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 40, at 81-83.

The study concludes that "when an elector cannot, among [a] welter of public officials, easily identify his representatives, his attention will certainly drift elsewhere."
A rule of "one legislator one district" is advocated. Id. at 83.
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Present districts, for example, include approximately 68,000 people,
and multimember districts would probably be even larger. Such a resuit, especially in districts which presently cover wide areas of the
state, would militate against a representative and accountable state
legislature.
Finally, redistricting is left to the legislature, but the legislature is
authorized to appoint an expert, nonpartisan body to aid in that endeavor. Redistricting is a highly political task that should be isolated
as far as possible from partisan pressures by delegating the bulk of the
reapportionment process to the expert body.
§ 9. ELECTIONS AND QUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS. Elections for the legislature shall occur on the first Tuesday in November
unless otherwise directed by the legislature. No person shall be eligible
for election to the legislature who shall not be a citizen of the United
States and a qualified voter in the district from which he or she is
chosen. The legislature shall judge the elections and qualifications of
its members, subject to the requirements of Section 11.
Commentary: Section 9 follows present constitutional provisions except as to the Code of Ethics Commission described in Section 11.
§ 10. OFFICERS. The office of lieutenant governor is hereby abolished
and references to that office in this constitution are hereby declared
null and void. The legislature shall create positions for its own presiding officers, and elect those officers.
Commentary: Section 10 provides for two major changes. First, the
office of lieutenant governor is abolished. The lieutenant governor's
current duties include acting as president of the Senate, and acting as
governor in the absence of the governor from the state. The lieutenant
governor's duties in the Senate are minimal (justifying the abolition of
the office), and his duties as acting governor could be performed by
some other elected executive officer.
Second, the legislature creates positions for its own presiding officers,
and elects those officers. Such a course enhances legislative independence
while eradicating the possibility of an executive officer unduly influencing legislative committee assignments.
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§ 11. CODE OF ETHICS. The legislature shall adopt a Code of Ethics which:
(a) Provides that no member with a direct economic interest in a
bill may vote on it;
(b) Provides conduct regulations for legislative members;
(c) Provides for the offense of corrupt solicitation or bribery of
members of the legislature or public officers of the state; and
(d) Incorporates existing election campaign law.
The Code of Ethics shall be enforced by a commission consisting of
five members appointed for five-year terms by the governor with the
consent of the legislature, provided that no more than three members
shall be of the same political party. The commission may impose sanctions including expulsion of a member following a hearing, subject to
mandatory direct review by the supreme court.
Commentary: In order to remedy an increasing lack of public confidence in the governmental process, the legislature should be affirmatively required to adopt a Code of Ethics defining rules for legislative
members and incorporating existing public disclosure and campaign
rules. Such a Code would be enforced by an independent commission
with full powers including the power to expel members. This provision
is substantially stronger than the present internal ethics mechanisms
14 8
of both houses.
§ 12. COMPENSATION. Each member of the legislature shall receive compensation for his or her services that shall be no less than
one-half of the compensation set by law for the governor, and for
reasonable expenses incurred in legislative work. Any changes by law
in the compensation of the governor shall not take effect for purposes
of determining the compensation of members of the legislature until
the expiration of the term of the Senators qualified when the compen148.

See INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 49-51. Codes

of ethics for employees of the executive branch are not uncommon. See 18 U.S.C. §§
201-18 (1970); Buss, The Massachusetts Conflict of Interest Statute: An Analysis,
45 BOSTON U.L. REV. 299 (1965).
It is not likely that the case of Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), will
affect the validity of the proposed Code of Ethics or the accompanying commission.
because the right to expel a member of the legislature will be constitutionally authorized in Washington. For a discussion of the Powell case see Asper, Bischoff. Dixon.
Gitelman, Hobbs, Laughlin. Linde, McKay, Rice, Rosen, Sandalow. & Weckstein.
Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 58 (1969).
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sation bill was enacted. No legislator during his or her term of office
shall engage in any outside business or enterprise that shall substantially affect his or her ability to perform legislative duties.
Commentary: Section 12 reflects a belief that legislators should be
adequately paid to devote full-time attention to legislative business and
to relations with constituents in home district . Pay is set at 50% of
the governor's salary plus actual expenses, and per diem is abolished.
Salary increases are not effective until the legislators face re-election.
As a practical matter outside business activities, if not ended, would
be severely curtailed.
The method of compensation contained in Section 12, when combined with a smaller unicameral legislature, would be less expensive
than the present bicameral legislature, provide for greater staff services
per member than present, and prevent the exodus of qualified members
14 9
from the legislature for economic reasons.
§ 13. PRIVILEGES. Members of the legislature shall- be subject to
arrest for criminal violations, but shall not be subject to civil process
during the session of the legislature, nor for fifteen days next before
the commencement of each session. No member of the legislature shall
149.

A number of legislators expressed the view that quality personnel, not in-

stitutional reform, is necessary to improve legislative performance. Typical of these
responses were the following:

'To improve the legislature, you need to improve the people in it. This does not
occur by making it fulltime, professional. The best people in the legislature are
those who are qualified, capable, dedicated to their tasks, but who do not just

consider themselves fulltime politicians running for office."
"The main ingredient that is needed to improve the legislative process is active,
willing, competitive participation by experienced and competent citizens. A legislature of experts cannot possibly do as well."
"In our efforts to obtain 'good' government I believe we turn too often to

ideas for 'reforming the system' rather than the hard, tough job of judging the
ideas of people who run the system. These people will make any system work

but the effectiveness of that system depends on what makes them tick. What is
in their mind (their ideas?) and how sensitive to humanity's needs are they?"
'The basic need and unresolved question is how do we retain the sustained interest of the public to encourage persons with ability and integrity to seek
public office when there are only modest psychological and monetary rewards
encouraging them to stay in it?"
Response of varous legislators to authors' poll (on file with the Washington Law

Review). While the quality of members is important, it is also necessary to note
that without institutional changes high quality personnel cannot afford to surrender
more lucrative private ventures for public service.
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be liable in any civil or criminal action in any manner for words
spoken in debate in the legislature.
Commentary: The immunity of legislators from criminal prosecution
during sessions is abolished primarily because of its potential for
abuse by members during legislative sessions.
§ 14. MEMBERS HOLDING CONCURRENT OFFICES. No member may simultaneously hold a seat in the legislature and serve in any
other elective office under the authority of the State of Washington or
the United States.
Commentary: Section 14 precludes simultaneous holding of multiple
elective offices. In addition, it abolishes the present proscription of
Section 13 of Article II, that prevents a member of the legislature
from serving in an office whose compensation had been increased
during the member's term. This change would eliminate the problem
posed in the 1975 primary election for Secretary of State, wherein
several qualified candidates who had filed for the office were removed
from the ballot because they had been members of the legislature
when the compensation for the office of Secretary of State had been
increased. 150
§ 15. IMPEACHMENT. The legislature shall have the sole power of
impeachment. The concurrence of two-thirds of all the members
shall be necessary for impeachment, provided that interested members
shall not be qualified to vote. Impeachments shall be tried by the
legislature sitting as a judicial tribunal. No person shall be convicted
and removed from office without a concurring vote of three-fourths of
the members.
Commentary: This section follows existing constitutional provisions
except that the unicameral legislature sits as the tribunal for impeachments. Additional requirements pertaining to impeachment are
set forth in the Washington Constitution, article V.

150. See Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wn. 2d 189. 543 P.2d 229 (1975); Daly
v. Chapman. 85 Wn. 2d 780, 539 P.2d 831 (1975).
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§ 16. VACANCIES IN ELECTIVE OFFICES. Vacancies in the legislature shall be filled by the governor from among a list of three candidates of the same legislative district and same political party submitted
to the governor by the pertinent party caucus, until a special election
to select a replacement under procedures established by the legislature can be held. Vacancies in local offices shall be filled in special
elections under procedures established by the legislature.
Commentary: Section 16 provides for a simplified method of filling vacancies in legislative and local elective offices and places responsibility
for special election procedure in the legislature.
§ 17. VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR. The legislature shall prescribe the order of succession by state elected officers
to the office of Governor when that office is vacant or the Governor
is incapacitated.
Commentary: This section, in light of the abolition of the office of
lieutenant governor in Section 10, provides that the legislature shall
adopt the order of succession to the office of governor when that office
is vacant, much like the power accorded to the Congress in relation
to the Presidency. 5 1
§ 18. GOVERNMENT CONTINUITY IN EMERGENCIES. The
legislature shall enact legislation providing for the continuity of state
and local government operations in the event of enemy attack or dire
natural catastrophe. The legislature may provide for the temporary
succession of persons to municipal and constitutional offices where
the incumbents or legal successors of those offices are unavailable for
carrying on the powers and duties of such offices.
Commentary: Section 18 follows the present constitutional provision.
§ 19. SINGLE HOUSE APPLICABILITY. All provisions of the constitution and the laws of the State of Washington relating to the legislature, the Senate, or the House of Representatives or members thereof, are hereby applicable to the legislature consisting of a single chamber and the members thereof.
151.

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1789); 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
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Commentary: This section provides that the unicameral legislative
form is to be adopted in the constitution and laws in all instances
where one house or the bicameral legislature are presently applicable.
This is substantially similar to the measure found in the Nebraska Con1 52
stitution.

152.
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NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1.

